Endowments and Existential Threats

A couple of years ago I received a call from the University of Pennsylvania, my Alma Mater, wanted a donation to support students at Penn. Note that they always get students to call, never administrators. As it happens, just a few weeks before, I had received the alumni magazine with a pie chart showing the endowment, how much interest had been earned, and how the money was distributed. That year it was a little less than a $billion in interest, but I was astonished to see they were unable to spend all of it. (Note that in 2024 they earned $1.5billion.) I explained to the poor student on the other end of the line to explain to me why they needed money when they couldn't spend all of what they had just earned. He had no clue, but it wasn't his fault and the answer wasn't in his script.

Just a couple years later and the best president ever in the history of the world (his evaluation) decided to go after some mostly Ivy League universities for assorted policies (mostly related to support for non-white students but generally falling into the generic "woke" category -- see below) and punish them by canceling their federal funds used for assorted research, e.g. cancer research, climate, DEI etc. (Table3)

This is a table showing endowment for 2025 and reported interest for 2024 for universities targeted by Trump:

Columbia caved almost immediately, resorting to groveling mode, followed by several others with the exception of Harvard who took the administration to court and won!  All this got me thinking about the role of endowments and what they are for. I realize there may be certain restrictions placed on gifts and the general idea is to help maintain the university in perpetuity, i.e. an existential purpose.  This is how most universities allocate interest from endowments:

Now, using Columbia as an example, the interest available to them in 2025 to counter Trump's threat was $1.6billion.  Now the $400million Trump threaten to cancel, while not peanuts, could easily have been absorbed by the interest earned that year or perhaps taken out of the principal, since it could have been considered an existential threat.

That leads us to some general considerations. The 2025 fiscal year has exposed a profound strategic paradox for the American Ivy League: a period of unprecedented endowment growth occurring alongside escalating, targeted threats to federal research funding. While institutions like Columbia, Penn, and Harvard reported "record-breaking" investment returns, they simultaneously entered a period of heightened institutional insecurity. Under the current political climate, federal support—once a neutral pillar of the research enterprise—has been transformed into a tool for "weaponized federalism." The strategic management of these FY2025 windfalls is no longer merely a fiduciary exercise in capital preservation; it is a matter of national institutional security, i.e. existential.

The massive interest surplus earned this year represents more than a financial triumph; it is a missed opportunity to construct a "fiscal shield" against federal interference. Despite the windfall, leadership remains reactive. Current institutional hesitation to mobilize this liquidity leaves the core mission of free inquiry exposed to administrative coercion. The following analysis details the financial mechanics of this windfall and the urgent necessity of deploying it to insulate these institutions from politically motivated funding volatility.

The 2025 fiscal year was an "uncanny" window of performance, characterized by a tight clustering of returns between 11% and 12.4%.  For Harvard, which operates on an 8.0% long-term target (comprising a 5% payout and 3% inflation buffer), the 11.9% return represents a ~3.9% "excess alpha"—a liquid surplus that currently sits untapped for defensive purposes.

 

Institution	Total Asset Value (AUM) as of June 30, 2025	FY2025 Investment Return	Trailing 10-Year Annualized Return	Budget Supported by Endowment
Columbia	$15.9 Billion	12.4%	7.8%	12%
Penn	$24.8 Billion	12.2%	9.2%	19%
Harvard	$56.9 Billion	11.9%	9.6%*	Nearly 40%

The strategic risk posed by "uncertainty in the funding environment" has transitioned from a theoretical concern to a catastrophic financial liability. We are seeing the emergence of a "liquidity trap" where massive net assets fail to prevent institutional debt increases.  Universities find themselves in a trap of their own making. They have left themselves open to federal pressure and coercion by not using their funds to conduct important research but without federal bullying.  Universities lust after the money because of the indirect cost overhead which is gravy for the institutions, sometimes as high as 50%.

Penn is a good example.  Despite possessing $33.9 billion in total net assets and reporting a "strong operating performance," Penn was forced into a $463 million debt increase. A primary driver was a $175 million federal funding pause initiated by the Trump administration, specifically targeting the University’s policies on transgender athletes. This $175 million withdrawal illustrates the fragility of the research enterprise; Penn remains reliant on federal grants even as its balance sheet swells.

This vulnerability is systemic. Columbia University identifies government grants and contracts as one of its three largest revenue streams. Traditional spending models have proved structurally ill-equipped for weaponized federalism, as they offer no mechanism to instantly pivot endowment liquidity to replace withdrawn federal support. Without a dedicated "fiscal shield," these multi-billion-dollar institutions remain susceptible to being coerced through their research budgets.

Institutional leaders frequently cite "intergenerational duty" and the "Endowment Spending Rule" as barriers to rapid fiscal mobilization. They argue that the 5% payout vs. 3% inflation balance is a legal and ethical mandate that prevents the repurposing of endowment principal.

However, the "principal cannot be repurposed" dogma is increasingly contradicted by market data. Harvard and Columbia point to donor restrictions—legal requirements to follow specific gift instructions—and the rising Federal Endowment Tax as primary inhibitors to liquidity. Yet, the 2025 TIFF/NACUBO reports reveal a significant shift: larger endowments are increasingly utilizing "Special Appropriations." In FY2025, the majority of these specially appropriated funds were directed toward operating budgets. This proves that when institutional survival is at stake, the barrier to mobilization is a matter of governance and political will, not just donor law. The current "passive stewardship" model uses intergenerational duty as a shield for institutional paralysis. And fore-thinking administrators can always encourage donors not to attach any restrictions or requirements to their gifts.

To mitigate the risk of politically motivated interference, administrators must consider academic freedom as an existential requirement.  Why not allocate a percentage of interest in high interest yielding years to a fund that would also grow, that could be used to prevent federal intervention?  It might include monies for legal defense, contingency research funding, and promotional campaigns to build support for the university's mission and independence. Such resources would signal to policymakers that the institution has the liquidity to maintain autonomy regardless of federal withdrawals.

Ivy League leadership must shift from "passive stewardship" to "active defense." The record returns of fiscal year 2025 are a hollow victory if they are merely reinvested while the university's core mission is eroded by political volatility. If these multi-billion-dollar windfalls are not utilized to insulate the mission of free inquiry now, the long-term "purchasing power" of the endowment will support only a compromised, hollowed-out academic environment. A $56.9 billion endowment is a hollow monument if the research it funds is dictated by the whims of a federal administration. If your mission is important defend it;  if not, don't do it.

The university’s autonomy is its most valuable asset; it is time to prove that it is not for sale.

Eric Welch, GFS, '65; Penn,'69

Resources used, all tables are mine as are any errors.

• Columbia Finance. "IMC CEO Statement on FY25 Endowment Returns." Columbia University. October 23, 2025.

• Columbia University. "Financial Overview | Columbia University in the City of New York.".

• Hamlin, Jessica. "Ivy League endowments' uncanny year." PitchBook. November 4, 2025. https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ivy-league-endowments-uncanny-year

• Narvekar, N.P. “Narv.” "Harvard Management Company: Message from the Chief Executive Officer." Harvard Management Company. October 2025.

• Penn Office of Investments. "About Us | Penn Office of Investments." University of Pennsylvania. https://www.thedp.com/article/2025/09/penn-board-of-trustees-meeting-sept-25

• Shaughnessy, Aidan. "Penn Board of Trustees reviews faculty appointments, budget resolutions to end fiscal year 2025." The Daily Pennsylvanian. September 26, 2025.

• TIFF Investment Management. "FY2025 NACUBO Results Show Strong Returns but Rising Pressures on Institutions’ Budgets." February 17, 2026.

• Yardley, Jonathan. "Comparing Ivy League Endowment Returns." Chief Investment Officer (CIO). November 11, 2025

 

 

 

Why Bombs Don't Break Regimes

In the high-stakes arena of international affairs, military coercion is often portrayed as a precise, low-cost intervention—what some have dubbed the "aerial surgeon." For policymakers seeking to avoid the political and human costs of ground operations, the promise of air power to compel regime change appears both elegant and expedient. The underlying assumption is straightforward: inflict sufficient damage from altitude, and the target regime will either capitulate or collapse under domestic pressure.

Yet historical precedent consistently undermines this optimistic calculus. From the Luftwaffe’s failure to break British morale during the Blitz (1940) to the United States’ decade-long "Rolling Thunder" campaign over North Vietnam (1965–1968), strategic bombing has demonstrated a near-universal inability to achieve political objectives through punishment alone. These campaigns did not weaken resolve—they often hardened it. The lesson is clear: air power, while capable of inflicting material damage, rarely alters the calculus of regime survival.

A central fallacy in the doctrine of strategic bombing is the assumption that civilian suffering will erode public support for a regime. In reality, external aggression often triggers a powerful unifying effect. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), we observe that when a nation faces an external threat, internal divisions tend to dissolve in favor of collective identity and national solidarity.

This "rally-around-the-flag" phenomenon is not merely a spontaneous outburst of patriotism. It is systematically reinforced by elite consensus. Even political opponents of the ruling regime—dissidents, opposition leaders, and civil society figures—often suspend criticism during periods of external attack. This convergence of elite and public sentiment creates a formidable barrier to regime change, as the regime is perceived not as a target of domestic discontent but as a defender of national sovereignty.

Thus, rather than weakening the regime, sustained bombing can inadvertently strengthen its legitimacy, portraying the government as the nation’s last line of defense.

Modern air campaigns are frequently marketed as "precision" operations, capable of isolating targets with minimal collateral impact. However, the reality of urban warfare and complex terrain often undermines this narrative. Even advanced targeting systems struggle to distinguish between military installations and civilian infrastructure in densely populated areas.

When civilian casualties occur—inevitable in any large-scale bombing campaign—the strategic consequences are profound. They generate widespread resentment, fuel recruitment for insurgent movements, and provide powerful propaganda tools for the regime. In many cases, the very act of bombing becomes a recruitment event for the opposition, turning victims into combatants. Moreover, the perception of disproportionate force—especially when inflicted by a foreign power—can galvanize nationalist sentiment and deepen the regime’s grip on power.

Regimes are not monolithic entities defined solely by their leaders. They are sustained by intricate networks of security forces, intelligence agencies, and bureaucratic institutions. These structures are designed to endure crises, including external military pressure. Even when leadership is targeted or disrupted, alternative command structures often activate seamlessly. The regime’s ability to reorganize, relocate, and continue operations—often with increased secrecy and control—undermines the assumption that bombing can "decapitate" a government. In many cases, air strikes merely force the regime to go underground, not collapse.

Furthermore, the very institutions that maintain control—such as state media and surveillance systems—are often decentralized or redundant, allowing them to survive and adapt under bombardment.

Strategic bombing is often justified as a tool of coercive diplomacy—using the threat of force to extract concessions. However, the effectiveness of coercion depends on the target’s perception of the costs of resistance versus compliance.
For regimes that perceive survival as paramount—especially those with authoritarian or ideologically driven leadership—the cost of capitulation may be seen as greater than the cost of enduring bombardment. In such cases, the regime may calculate that prolonged resistance, even at great human and material cost, is preferable to surrender.

Additionally, external powers often lack the political will or strategic patience to sustain a campaign long enough to achieve its objectives. The result is a premature withdrawal, which is interpreted not as a victory but as a sign of weakness—further emboldening the regime.

While air power remains a critical component of military capability, its utility as a tool for regime change is severely overstated. The four truths outlined above—cohesion under threat, the limits of precision, institutional resilience, and the failure of coercive diplomacy—demonstrate that bombing campaigns rarely achieve their intended political outcomes.

For policymakers, the takeaway is clear: air power must be integrated into a broader, politically grounded strategy. It should not be viewed as a substitute for diplomacy, intelligence, or economic statecraft. When used in isolation, it risks becoming not a tool of influence, but a catalyst for prolonged conflict and unintended consequences. True strategic success lies not in the number of bombs dropped, but in the depth of understanding of the adversary’s psychology, institutions, and incentives.
 

Resources for this essay:

Pape, R. A. (2014). Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war. Cornell University Press. (my library) (n.d.).Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/gauging-the-impact-of-massive-u-s-israeli-strikes-on-iran

Hinman, Ellwood P . The Politics of Coercion.  Free download
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Display/Article/4117513/the-politics-of-coercion/    Lt. Col. Hinman's short paper argues that existing theories of coercive airpower — punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial — each have significant limitations when applied to the limited, politically restrained conflicts of the post–Cold War era. After analyzing each theory against three defining attributes of modern conflict (limited and nonprotracted war, political restraint, and the need for a favorable postwar peace), Hinman finds that none is adequate as a stand-alone approach.

 
Jan, F. N. (2026, March 2). ‘Destruction is not the same as political success’: US bombing of Iran shows little evidence of endgame strategy. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/destruction-is-not-the-same-as-political-success-us-bombing-of-iran-shows-little-evidence-of-endgame-strategy-277201

https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/bombing-to-win-at-25/

Lambet, Benjamin S. Operation Allied Force: Lessons for the Future, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB75.html

Review: Steel Boat, Iron Hearts: A U-boat Crewman's Life Aboard U-505

 U-505, the U-Boot that currently resides in the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago, has to have been one of the luckiest ships in WW II. It survived multiple botched patrols, was the only German sub whose captain committed suicide while on patrol, and was the most damaged sub to be able to return to base. It was captured in 1944 and secreted away until after the war, when it was donated to the museum. It's a spectacular exhibit but not for the claustrophobic.

It was imperative for the allies that it remain secret the sub had been captured as the Allies did not want even a hint that they might have captured an Enigma machine (they already had, but it was essential the Germans not suspect Enigma had been compromised.) Admiral King was furious they had not sunk the sub and almost had the task force commander court-martialed. The crew was hidden in Louisiana and not even allowed Red Cross parcels to protect the secret it had been captured. The Germans finally declared her sunk with all hands and notified the next of kin. The crew did not make it home until 1947. One interesting tidbit is that Ewald Felix, a member of the crew, helped the U.S. prevented the sub from sinking. He was isolated from the rest of the crew for fear he would be killed as a traitor. After the war, he lived in Poland and died in 1990.

The operational history of U-505 serves as a compelling case study in the duality of naval fortune, where the vessel was regarded as both exceptionally "lucky" and hopelessly "jinxed." From a strategic intelligence perspective, the boat’s early service record highlights the critical importance of submarine durability in the attritional environment of the Battle of the Atlantic. While structural resilience allowed the boat to survive catastrophic encounters that would have claimed lesser vessels, this physical longevity inadvertently set the stage for a protracted psychological and mechanical erosion that would eventually compromise its operational security.

One reason for the U-505's survival was that it kept having to return to Lorient for repairs almost immediately after leaving port. Repair workers were mostly French and there was constant sabotage of the boat that would show up (almost catastrophically) in diving tests or engine breakdowns usually within days after leaving for patrol. They seemed to spend more time getting repaired as stalking the allies.

The vessel's reputation for resilience was established on November 11, 1942, during a patrol in the Caribbean. A Lockheed Hudson launched a precision air attack, delivering a 250-lb bomb that struck the foredeck directly. The explosion was severe enough to tear the deck gun from the mount and breach the pressure hull. Despite the initial command to abandon ship, the crew executed a desperate two-week salvage effort to maintain buoyancy.

U-505 eventually limped back to Lorient on December 12, 1942, earning the "mixed honor" of being the most heavily damaged U-boat of the war to successfully return to port.

Following these repairs, U-505’s combat effectiveness was methodically neutralized by the French Resistance. This systematic campaign of industrial sabotage in the Lorient dockyards did more than merely disable the boat; it functioned as a form of psychological warfare against the commander, Peter Zschech. The resulting six consecutive aborted patrols—where the boat failed even to clear the Bay of Biscay—turned U-505 into a fleet-wide laughingstock. Specific mechanical failures included:

• Defective Welds: Intentional structural weaknesses that led to failures during high-pressure diving tests.

• Engine Sabotage: Strategic tampering by French dock workers that ensured engine breakdowns within days of departure.

• Systemic Failure: The inability to sustain a patrol created a feedback loop of humiliation, as peers noted that Zschech was the only captain "guaranteed to return home" while other crews were lost at sea.

In the isolated, high-pressure environment of a submerged U-boat, the commanding officer's psychological state is the single most critical point of failure. The tenure of Peter Zschech demonstrates how a breakdown in leadership doctrine can transform a crew into a strategic liability. While Zschech was a professional veteran of the celebrated U-124, his transition to independent command revealed a temperament ill-suited for the stresses of the late-war Atlantic. He was characterized as a "hard," bad-tempered officer whose perceived indifference to morale exacerbated the frustrations caused by the boat's constant mechanical failures.

The crisis reached its terminal point on October 24, 1943. During a concentrated depth charge attack by Allied destroyers off the Azores, Zschech suffered a catastrophic mental break. In an unprecedented breach of naval discipline, he committed suicide in the control room using a Walther PPK pistol, in full view of the men he was tasked to lead. The impact of this event remains a subject of historical debate.

Geobeler challenges the traditional view of the suicide, which maintains the suicide shattered the crew's discipline, creating a vacuum of leadership and a climate of panic that persisted until the boat's capture. He insists Morale arguably improved because Zschech was loathed; his death removed a toxic presence, and the crew continued to operate professionally.

The capture of a submarine intact on the high seas is one of the most significant achievements in naval intelligence, providing a rare opportunity for technological reverse-engineering. The boarding party’s success was a triumph of improvisation; notably, only one member of the USN team had ever been on a submarine before. The recovery hinged on the "Sea Strainer" incident. Crewman Hans Goebeler had removed the strainer cover to flood the boat, but in the rush to evacuate a vessel rendered unmanageable by a jammed rudder, the cover was left nearby. USN sailor Zenon Lukosius discovered the gushing breach and, alongside Lieutenant (jg) Albert David, successfully replaced the cover despite the risk of booby traps. He was awarded the Medal of Honor.

This strategic success necessitated that the crew of U-505 vanish into a shadow world of clandestine internment to maintain the secret of the Enigma breakthrough.

Another salient feature of the book is how British and American bombing attacks actually hardened the resolve of the crew to fight on and get revenge for the damage being done to their surroundings and at home. The historical and contemporary record of using strategic bombing to force regime change is remarkably consistent: while air-power can decimate infrastructure and military hardware, it almost never results in the collapse of a government or a popular uprising.

Research across a century of warfare—from World War II to the ongoing operations in 2026—suggests that bombing often has the opposite effect, reinforcing a regime's grip on power through "rally-round-the-flag" dynamics. This was true in Germany, Vietnam, Iraq, and 2025 Iran.

Trump take note.

For further reading on that last point see https://www.newstimes.com/news/article/destruction-is-not-the-same-as-political-21950977.php 

 

Doomsday by Design: Strategic Doctrine, System Fragility, and the Recurring Risk of Accidental Nuclear War

 I have been collecting assorted quotes and pulled out some pertinent ones about nuclear weapons. The challenge, as George W. Bush memorably put it, is that a president wouldn’t even have time to get off the “crapper” before having to make a launch decision, a decision that could be based on partial, contradictory, or even false information. Ronald Reagan, when he assumed the presidency, was said to have been shocked that he would have as little as six minutes to make a decision to launch. I highly recommend the movie House of Dynamite to get a sense of how the decisions are made and the limited amount of time available to make those decisions.

The socio-biologist E. O. Wilson described the central problem of humanity this way: “We have Paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology.” The main challenge of the 80 years since the Trinity atomic test has been that we do not possess the cognitive, spiritual, and emotional capabilities necessary to successfully manage nuclear weapons without the risk of catastrophic failure.

Technical flaws are inevitable in any complex system. I read and reviewed an excellent book entitled Normal Accidents several years ago. Perrow explains how human reliance on technology and over-design will inevitably lead to failure precisely because of inherent safety design. [2] Just a couple examples: 

November 9, 1979 – NORAD False Alarm
A training tape simulating a massive Soviet strike was mistakenly loaded onto an operational NORAD computer. The system flagged a large‑scale attack, prompting SAC, ICBM crews, nuclear bombers, and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post to go on high alert. Six minutes later, satellite data showed no real launch, and the alert was cancelled. The error was traced to the technician’s mistake. As senior State Department adviser Marshall Shulman later noted, such false alerts are not uncommon.

 

October 28, 1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis False Alarm
Radar operators in Moorestown, NJ, reported an imminent nuclear strike aimed at Tampa, FL, just before 9 am. The warning turned out to be a false positive caused by a test tape simulating a Cuban missile launch being run simultaneously with an unexpected satellite passing overhead. Overlapping radars that could have verified the event were offline, and the operators had not received the usual satellite‑pass notification because the responsible facility was reassigned elsewhere. The alarm was quickly dismissed.

In 2007, John Rubel decided to write a short memoir (1) that detailed his experiences working on the grand plan for nuclear war. As Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering, Rubel was invited to attend a very secret meeting of the top military brass that discussed and presented SIOP-62 that determined how an attack would be met, i.e. the nuclear response. It was guaranteed to cause about 2 billion deaths, which, at that time (1960--I was 13 at the time) represented about 30% of the world's population. They also analyzed the possibility of accidental firing of the Minuteman missiles as well as the options available to the president, none really, and as noted above, s/he had but minutes to decide what to do. It amounted to genocide on a massive scale. "Rubel revealed this information in a short memoir. As Rubel prepared for his own death, he summoned the courage to express a long-repressed truth. That he felt remorse for having participated in such a “heart of darkness” plan. For saying nothing for so many decades after the fact. What he was part of, Rubel wrote, was a plan for “mass extermination.” [2]

SIOP-62 and the design of the MinuteMan missile system had a commonality: “Both deliberately removed effective operational control from the President or any other civilian or even military commander in the event of a nuclear confrontation. And the Minuteman launch system design, a “detail” not generally considered within the purview or even competence of high-level policy makers, invited the possibility of unauthorized or accidental mass launch of tens or even hundreds of nuclear-tipped missiles with little or no warning.”[3]) Numerous military leaders argued for a pre-emptive strike rather than wait for an attack and they actively lobbied for it, retaliation with mutual destruction be damned.

Rubel’s Doomsday Delayed demonstrates how strategic doctrine became hardwired into technological systems during the formative years of the Minuteman ICBM and SIOP-62. The Minuteman missile was praised as a survivable second-strike deterrent: hardened silos, solid-fuel propulsion, and near-instant launch capability. Yet these features also supported launch-on-warning logic and narrowed civilian decision space. The original launch architecture required only a limited “vote” among underground control centers to fire an entire squadron of missiles, emphasizing speed over deliberation. Early electromechanical vulnerabilities further exposed the risks of unintended launch.

SIOP-62 compounded this rigidity by offering essentially all-or-nothing strike options. The scale of projected casualties—hundreds of millions—was matched by the narrowness of political flexibility. Rubel’s central insight is that strategic systems can “determine policy by their very design.”¹

The 1998 New England Journal of Medicine  Special Report [7], issued not long after the fall of the Soviet Union, challenged the widespread assumption that the end of the Cold War eliminated nuclear danger. The authors concluded that U.S. and Russian nuclear forces remained on high alert and that launch-on-warning procedures persisted unchanged. They warned that aging Russian technical systems, deteriorating early-warning satellites, and declining morale among nuclear personnel had increased the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch.

The NEJM analysis emphasized that both countries maintained thousands of warheads capable of being launched within approximately fifteen minutes. Launch procedures allowed only a few minutes for detection, top-level decision-making, and dissemination of authorization. Such compressed timelines magnify the danger of false alarms, technical malfunction, or misinterpretation.

The NEJM authors also noted that even after the 1994 U.S.–Russian agreement to “detarget” missiles, no additional time had been added to the launch process; retargeting is simply part of routine procedures.⁵ Thus symbolic de-escalation did not materially reduce operational risk.

The Union of Concerned Scientists’ fact sheet documents numerous “broken arrows” and false warnings, including radar misreadings, computer errors, and hardware malfunctions. These incidents reveal that technical failure is not anomalous but recurring. "Despite the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure, a misinterpreted incident or unauthorized action, could trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war." — U.S. –Soviet Accident Measures Agreement, September 1971 [4],  The sheet notes that while there are multiple redundant safety mechanisms to prevent accidentally triggering a device, there are been failures and only luck has prevented an explosion. Many accidents have happened over the United States, but we never hear of them as publicity is disallowed. Similarly, we can only assume a similar number of accidents have happened in other nuclear countries in spite of precautions.

The 1983 Petrov incident remains one of the most consequential examples. Soviet satellites detected what appeared to be incoming U.S. missiles. All systems pointed to an imminent attack. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov judged the alert to be a malfunction rather than an attack. Subsequent investigation showed that sunlight reflecting off clouds had fooled the satellite sensors. His refusal to escalate the warning likely prevented retaliatory launch.

The NEJM article reinforces this concern, identifying false-warning–triggered launch as one of the most plausible accidental-war scenarios. It specifically referenced the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident as an example of how ambiguous data nearly initiated Russian launch procedures under standard protocols.

On January 25, 1995, a Norwegian scientific rocket was mistaken by Russian radar for a possible submarine-launched ballistic missile. President Boris Yeltsin activated the nuclear briefcase for the first time in history. Only minutes remained before a response deadline under launch-on-warning doctrine when Russian analysts concluded the object posed no threat.

These incidents demonstrate how automated systems, when coupled with high-alert postures, compress decision time to a matter of minutes and elevate ambiguous data into existential threats.

The NEJM article moved beyond strategic analysis to model the public health consequences of an accidental intermediate-scale Russian submarine launch. The authors analyzed a scenario involving a single Delta-IV submarine carrying 16 missiles with multiple 100-kiloton warheads. They estimated that if 48 warheads detonated over eight major U.S. urban areas, immediate firestorm deaths could total approximately 6.8 million people.

The physical effects would include super-heated firestorms with near-100 percent lethality within several kilometers of each detonation, widespread fallout zones delivering lethal radiation doses within hours, collapse of sanitation and medical infrastructure, and likely epidemics of infectious disease. The authors concluded that secondary deaths from radiation and infrastructure collapse could exceed initial fatalities. (See Annie Jacobsen's book for a precise recounting of the process.)

Health care systems would be completely overwhelmed. Most major medical centers in affected cities would be destroyed. The United States’ limited burn-care capacity—only about 1,700 beds nationwide—would be grossly insufficient. The NEJM authors emphasized that no effective medical response could meaningfully mitigate such destruction. Prevention, therefore, becomes the only viable public health strategy.

The NEJM report concluded that ballistic missile defense offers no reliable short-term solution and that de-alerting nuclear forces is both more feasible and more effective. The authors urged a verified bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia to remove missiles from high-level alert and eliminate rapid-launch capability. Similar recommendations have been advanced by the National Academy of Sciences, senior military leaders, and nuclear policy experts.

Rubel likewise credited civilian intervention during the Kennedy administration with correcting Minuteman vulnerabilities and expanding presidential control.¹ The UCS report similarly advocates reducing hair-trigger alert status to mitigate accidental launch risk.

These proposals share a common goal: extending decision time and restoring deliberative space to nuclear command systems. The logic is straightforward—if accidental or mistaken launch becomes physically impossible within minutes, the risk of catastrophe declines dramatically.

Across Cold War and post–Cold War contexts, a consistent pattern emerges. Nuclear systems are designed for speed. Warning systems are imperfect. Human error and technical malfunction are recurrent. Decision time is measured in minutes.

Rubel shows how doctrine became embedded in system design. The UCS documents repeated near-disasters. The Petrov and Norwegian rocket incidents illustrate how individual judgment narrowly prevented escalation. The NEJM assessment demonstrates that even a “limited” accidental launch would produce millions of immediate deaths and incalculable secondary casualties.

Nuclear catastrophe has been avoided not because systems are fail-safe, but because failure has thus far stopped short of irreversibility. As long as launch-on-warning postures and high-alert arsenals persist, the annual probability of accidental war—however small—remains nonzero. Over time, such probabilities accumulate. [9]

The most dangerous feature of nuclear arsenals is not their destructive yield but their speed. Extending decision time, removing weapons from hair-trigger alert, and ultimately eliminating nuclear arsenals altogether remain not merely strategic preferences but urgent public health imperatives.

---

Endnotes  

1. John H. Rubel, Doomsday Delayed: USAF Strategic Weapons Doctrine and SIOP-62, 1959–1962 (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2008).  https://www.si.edu/media/NASM/NASM-DoomsdayDelayed.pdf free download from the Smithsonian.

2. My review: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/37704050

1. Perrow, Charles  (1999) Normal Accidents: Living with high risk technologies. Princeton University Press.

2. Perrow, Charles. (2011) The next catastrophe: Reducing our vulnerabilities to natural, industrial, and terrorist disasters. Princeton University Press.

1. This follow-up to his 1999 book discusses solutions to the highly coupled systems in order to reduce the inevitability of accidents.

3. Jacobsen, Annie. Nuclear War: A Scenario, 2024.  Chap 1.

4. Rubel, , Preface

5. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons” (Fact Sheet): https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/04/Close%2520Calls%2520with%2520Nuclear%2520Weapons.pdf

6. “1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident,” Wikipedia.

7. TOI World Desk, “The first world leader to activate the ‘nuclear briefcase’: How a Norwegian research rocket nearly triggered nuclear war,” Times of India, Feb. 19, 2026.

8. Lachlan Forrow et al., “Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment,” New England Journal of Medicine 338, no. 18 (April 30, 1998): 1326–1331.

    9. Avenhaus, R., Fichtner, J., Brams, S. J., & Kilgour, D. M. (1989). The probability of nuclear war. Journal of Peace Research, 26(1), 91-99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343389026001009 

I really hesitate to even list this as a source.  However, it's an interesting attempt to statistically analyze and estimate the likelihood of nuclear war.  If you like lots of stuff like: then you'll love this article. According to George Sorenson, during the Cuban missile crisis ,   Kennedy estimated the chances of a major war between the United States and the Soviet Union to be somewhere between 30 and 50%. How he came to that conclusion and its validity would appear to be nothing but his intuition. The authors in this article have applied statistical methods to estimate the statistical likelihood given certain assumptions, e.g. first strike, accidental, erosion of trust, avoid defeat, etc.  It's an interesting exercise, but I'm not sure it gets us anywhere. One element they did not account for was a demented in the White House.  You can get the article (it's short) here.  Note that it was written just before the fall of the USSR,

 Other Sources

 Ellsberg, D. (2017). The doomsday machine: Confessions of a nuclear war planner. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.  Memoir by a former nuclear war planner who had access to highly classified plans; he describes Cold War launch authorities, hair‑trigger postures, and multiple times

Rhodes, R. (2007). Arsenals of folly. Vintage. Covers late–Cold War nuclear politics, arms racing, and crises around the Reagan–Gorbachev era, with attention to moments when misunderstanding and brinkmanship raised the risk of war.

Schlosser, E. (2014). Command and control. Michael Joseph.  (2013) Focuses on the 1980 Titan II missile explosion in Damascus, Arkansas, then widens out to a history of nuclear accidents, broken arrows, and close calls inside the U.S. arsenal, arguing that human error and system complexity make “perfect” safety impossible.