Ever since Dobbs we have found ourselves back in the middle of a heated national conversation about some very old decisions, and it has led us to a place where we are questioning the very foundation of how our courts function and, by extension, how our society maintains its stability. I am talking about the doctrine of stare decisis, that Latin phrase that basically means standing by what has already been decided. For a long time, most of us treated this as a settled, if slightly dusty, part of the legal furniture. But lately, it has become a live-wire political issue. The real tension we are seeing today isn't just about whether a specific case like Roe v. Wade or Miranda v. Arizona was right or wrong on the day it was written. Instead, the debate has shifted to a much more fundamental level: is the rule of following precedent a mandatory constitutional requirement baked into the very DNA of our government, or is it just a convenient judicial policy that we can toss aside whenever the political winds shift? Should Plessy or Dred Scott or Griswold or Brown be considered settled, permanent law? I have noticed that how someone answers that question usually depends entirely on what they are trying to achieve politically in the moment. Yet, the answer we settle on will determine whether our legal system remains a reliable anchor or turns into a weather vane.
Discussions about it are voluminous and were written about many decades ago with no resolution. I pulled just a few contrasting articles to get a flavor of the debate. Michael Paulsen v. Richard Fallon, if you will, each getting traction depending on your political views. Paulsen basically thinks that because the Constitution does not explicitly use the words stare decisis, the entire concept is merely a sub-constitutional judicial policy. To him, it is not a fundamental pillar of the law but a secondary tool. The logic here is deceptively simple: if the Constitution is the supreme law, and a past court made a mistake in interpreting it, then following that mistake is actually a violation of the judge's oath. Paulsen goes even further by suggesting that since this is just a policy, Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass a law simply abolishing the doctrine. He is quite open about his strategic motivation here. He isn't just looking for a theoretical debate; he wants to trigger the rejection of abortion rights. He has suggested that Congress could pass a law telling the Supreme Court to ignore precedent specifically in abortion cases. It is a selective repeal strategy that treats the law like a light switch that the legislature can flip if they don't like the way the judges are reading the map.
But when you start calling a foundational principle like precedent a mere policy, you really open a massive can of worms regarding what the judicial Power actually is. Professor Richard Fallon has provided a rebuttal to this, and it is a masterclass in constitutional defense. Fallon’s narrative is that Article III’s grant of the judicial Power isn't just an empty vessel for whatever the current majority wants to do. He argues that the authority to rely on precedent is inherently included in that power. He points back to the very beginning of our republic to show that this wasn't some later invention. Even Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 78, argued that to avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is absolutely indispensable that judges be bound down by strict rules and precedents. Hamilton’s point was that without these rules, a judge is just a politician in a robe. Fallon builds on this by noting that the judicial power also includes the power to invest judgments with finality. If Congress cannot pass a law to reopen a final judgment between two parties—which is a settled rule of our system—then they surely shouldn't be able to reach into the judge’s chambers and dictate the interpretive methodology the judge uses to reach those decisions.
The irony of Paulsen’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument is something a strategist has to appreciate for its sheer oddity. Fallon points out a peculiar logical trap here: if Congress really has the power to tell the Court to give less weight to precedent, wouldn't they also have the power to tell the Court to give it absolute weight? Imagine if Congress passed a law saying the Court could never overrule a past decision, even if it was obviously a disaster. That would be just as much of an unconstitutional power grab as Paulsen’s proposal. It would interfere with the core function of the judiciary to say what the law is, a principle established all the way back in Marbury v. Madison. By trying to pluck out the thread of stare decisis, Paulsen isn't just changing a policy; he is attempting to redefine the very nature of the judicial branch. This distinction between the merits of a case and the prudential rules of the court is vital. While Congress can change things like standing requirements—who gets to bring a lawsuit—they cannot tell the Court how to think about the core meaning of the Constitution itself.
It is always fascinating to see how the political variable dictates whether a commentator suddenly loves or hates the idea of following old rules. This is where the strategic masks usually slip. When a previous decision is something you hate, you call it a mere policy judgment that isn't an inexorable command. You see this in the way some originalists view stare decisis as a hurdle that stops them from getting back to the "true" 1787 meaning of the text. But when the decision is something you want to keep, suddenly that same doctrine is a fundamental pillar of the law and the ballast that keeps the ship of state from capsizing. We saw this play out in the Casey decision, where the Court admitted that while some Justices might personally dislike a prior ruling, the costs of overruling it were simply too high for the rule of law to bear. The truth is that stare decisis is often used as a shield when you are winning and dismissed as a nuisance when you are losing. But if we treat it as something we can switch off for "special" cases like abortion, we run into Fallon’s interwoven strands problem. Constitutional doctrines aren't isolated islands; they are a fabric. If you pull the thread on the right to abortion, you are also pulling on the thread of substantive due process, which is the same thread that holds up the idea that the Bill of Rights applies to the states or that the federal government must provide equal protection.
This brings us to a really discomfiting truth about legal legitimacy. Why do we actually follow these rules in the first place? If you ask an originalist, they will tell you it is because we all consented to the written Constitution back in 1787. But Fallon points out the obvious flaw that most people ignore: none of us were alive then. We haven't actually given our active, volitional consent to be governed by people who have been dead for two centuries. Instead, the legitimacy of our entire system rests on something much more fluid and, frankly, more fragile: widespread acceptance and reasonable justice. We follow the law because we accept the system as it works today. Stare decisis is the glue for this acceptance. It creates a sense of continuity that allows us to go about our lives without wondering if the entire legal order will be reinvented every Tuesday morning. It prevents the law from becoming a series of disconnected, arbitrary lurches from one political extreme to another.
If we were to follow the path Paulsen suggests and enter that dark corridor where precedent no longer matters, we wouldn't just be having a debate about one or two controversial cases. We would be inviting total legal chaos. Fallon is very clear about the "So What?" of this debate. If every single legal question was suddenly up for grabs because we decided that precedent is just a "policy," the burden on the Court and the country would be overwhelming. We would have to re-litigate whether the Bill of Rights even applies to the states. We would have to question whether the "one-person, one-vote" rule is valid or if it was just a "mistake" by a past Court. We would even have to wonder if the various regulatory agencies that run our economy are permissible under the separation of powers. No country could survive having to rethink its foundational principles in every single case that comes before a judge. We would be trading a stable, if imperfect, legal system for a never-ending cycle of constitutional crises where nothing is ever truly settled.
Even the idea of a selective repeal—just getting rid of stare decisis for abortion cases—is blatantly unconstitutional because it represents an attempt to skew the substantive outcome of judicial deliberations. It isn't a neutral effort to get the law right; it is a command to the Court to ignore the authorities that support one side while potentially leaving the other side’s arsenal intact. Once you recognize that stare decisis has constitutional stature, any attempt by Congress to selectively dismantle it stands naked as an exercise of raw political power over the law. Congress has plenty of ways to express its disagreement with the Court—they can pass resolutions, file amicus briefs, or pass new legislation to trigger a challenge—they cannot direct the Court to pay no heed to considerations of constitutional import.
I thought I would see what a current justice might have to say and in Barrett's article she explores the principle/policy within the context of the Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings. She argues that the Court’s weak presumption against overruling its own past decisions is not a flaw, but a necessary tool for mediating jurisprudential disagreement among justices who hold fundamentally different visions of the Constitution. By placing a heavy burden of justification on those who wish to overturn a case, the doctrine ensures that a new majority cannot simply impose its will through votes alone, but must instead provide a compelling reasoned defense for unsettling the law. Furthermore, Barrett highlights that stability is maintained not just by this doctrine, but by systemic features like vertical stare decisis and the certiorari process, which keep "superprecedents" and well-settled laws from being constantly challenged. Ultimately, the text presents a vision of the law that is both realistic and respectful of pluralism, allowing for the evolution of constitutional thought while protecting the basic continuity of the American legal system.
There were several references to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v Coronado (1932) in which he proposed a ringing endorsement of adhering to precedent:
"...Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because, in most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has repeatedly overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."
"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."
In the end, we are left with a sobering thought that every strategist and citizen needs to reckon with. Our entire constitutional order doesn't rest on a solid, unchanging rock of absolute truth. Instead, as Fallon so eloquently puts it, it rests on the potentially shifting sands of acceptance and reasonable justice. Stare decisis isn't a perfect doctrine, and it isn't an absolute rule that can never be broken. Even its strongest defenders acknowledge that some decisions are so misguided they have to go. But it is the best tool we have to prevent the law from becoming nothing more than a reflection of whoever happens to be in power at the moment. As much as we might wish for a more permanent foundation, the reality is that the law only works as long as we all agree to stand by what has been decided. Without that commitment to continuity, the fabric of our legal system doesn't just fray—it completely and irrevocably unravels.
Sources:
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S1-7-2-2/ALDE_00013237/%5B%27article%27,%20%272%27,%20%27branch%27,%20%27powers%27%5D. This is an annotated explanation of Article III. Section 1.
Aiken, Charles. Stare Decisis, Precedent, and the Constitution. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar., 1956), pp. 87-92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/443254
Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711 (2013). https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Barrett.pdf
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/285/393/
Fallon, Richard. Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology. New York Law Review, 08. 2018 https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-76-2-Fallon.pdf
Paulsen, Michael Stokes. Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1538 n.8 (2000) http://www.jstor.org/stable/797601
N.B. As our current president does everything he can to mold the law to his own purposes, and the legislature has abandoned any semblance of participation in government, it may be that judicial adherence to stare decisis may be the only saving grace to democracy.