Welch's Rarebits (cont.)

Sunday, March 29, 2026

Technophobia: Fear of Writing to AI, Been There Before Many Times

I was amused recently after reading numerous complaints and dire predictions regarding Artificial Intelligence and how it will supposedly bankrupt us, eliminate our jobs, take over the world, or fill in your own favorite horrible catastrophe. It reminded me of an article I read years ago about the intense fear engendered by the advent of the telephone. The history of human civilization is, in many respects, a history of technological disruption. From the development of written language to the emergence of the printing press, the steam engine, and the internet, each transformative technology has reconfigured the material, cognitive, and social conditions of human life. Yet alongside the practical adoption of these technologies, a remarkably consistent counter-narrative has emerged characterized by apprehension, moral condemnation, and predictions of societal harm.

These episodes of collective alarm share a recognizable structural logic. A new technology is identified as a potential threat; advocates with institutional authority amplify the concern; media coverage intensifies public anxiety; political actors demand regulatory responses; and eventually, as the technology becomes normalized, the alarm subsides only to recur with the next wave of innovation. In the domain of technology specifically, moral panics tend to cluster around a set of recurring anxieties. Societies across historical periods have consistently asked whether new technologies will endanger children, harm bodily or mental health, degrade morality, erode privacy, diminish cognitive capacities, destroy livelihoods, or undermine interpersonal relationships. The near-universal recurrence of these concerns across radically different technological contexts suggests that the panic response tells us as much about enduring human psychological preoccupations as it does about any specific technology.

One way to look at this is through the Sisyphean Cycle of Technology Panics. This model suggests a four-stage process where sociological factors generate public concern, political actors leverage that panic for their own purposes, scientists begin examining the technology but lack the frameworks to give quick answers, and finally, scientific progress proves too slow to inform policy before the cycle collapses and a new technology triggers the sequence all over again. The mythological reference is deliberate because, like Sisyphus condemned to roll his boulder endlessly uphill, society appears trapped in a futile repetition, asking nearly identical questions about successive technologies without the accumulated wisdom to resolve them.

A similar pattern exists regarding privacy. We often see an initial period of trusted beginnings when a technology is novel and risks are underspecified, followed by a phase of rising panic driven by regulators and academics. Eventually, there is a period of deflating fears as widespread adoption normalizes the technology, and finally, a phase of simply moving on as the tool is absorbed into the fabric of everyday life. While originally framed around privacy, this schema applies broadly to the trajectory of public alarm across almost every technological domain.

The documented history of technology-related moral panic begins as far back as classical antiquity. Around 370 BCE, Socrates articulated what remains one of the most structurally sophisticated critiques of any technology ever recorded, and it was directed at writing itself. As preserved in Plato's Phaedrus, the argument against writing comprised three distinct complaints. First, Socrates worried about memory and cognitive dependency, arguing that writing produces forgetfulness because people will stop using their natural faculty of memory. Second, he feared the production of false wisdom, suggesting that writing gives students the appearance of understanding rather than the substance. Finally, he complained about the passivity of the written word, noting that unlike a living teacher who can respond to questions, writing is passive and undiscriminating, reaching those with genuine understanding and the ignorant alike. The irony, of course, is that the technology Socrates distrusted is the sole vehicle through which his distrust survives.

This brings us to the concept of the pharmakon, a Greek term that functions simultaneously as remedy and poison. Every technology presents itself as a remedy for some human limitation and simultaneously operates as a poison that transforms or degrades some human capacity. This same ambivalence recurs across every debate about technological innovation from Plato to the present. We see this in modern concerns about pocket calculators or search engines. The tool enables the production of a solution while potentially weakening the user's genuine understanding of the subject matter.

The invention of the movable-type printing press produced what may be the first large-scale information panic in the modern sense. The rapid proliferation of printed materials generated alarm among scribes who feared for their jobs, Church officials who feared the democratization of Bible reading, and scholars who warned of information overload. Even the philosopher John Stuart Mill later lamented the degradation of intellectual culture in an era of mass print, observing that the proliferation of voices drowned out nuanced contributions and fostered superficial reading habits. His diagnosis of an attention economy degraded by informational abundance anticipates contemporary debates about social media and the crisis of deep reading with striking accuracy.

The early nineteenth century witnessed organized resistance to labor-saving technology among English textile workers known as Luddites. While their name is now used as a slur for anyone resisting change, their opposition was a rational response to rapid industrial transformation that brought real economic precariousness. We see echoes of this today with ride-sharing services that create new jobs through navigational technology while threatening the traditional taxi industry. While some argue that AI will benefit lower-skilled workers by raising the floor of quality, the displacement costs often fall disproportionately among workers least positioned to adapt.

Perhaps the most instructive episode is the response to steam power in the nineteenth century. The introduction of the steam locomotive produced a visceral category of alarm concerning the effects of high speed on the human nervous system. Speeds of twenty or thirty miles per hour were experienced as dangerously extreme. Medical authorities warned of Railway Spine, a diagnostic category used to explain nervous shock and neurological disturbance reported by passengers. Some even predicted outright delirium or the literal physical unraveling of brain tissue under the assault of unprecedented velocity. These fears circulated through respectable medical journals and parliamentary debates, mirroring contemporary anxieties about the neurological effects of prolonged screen exposure.

Beyond health, the steam panic involved the threat of catastrophic mechanical failure and environmental concerns. Early boiler explosions were genuinely dangerous and were reported with graphic detail in the press, creating a shorthand for technological catastrophe much like a nuclear meltdown or a cyber breach today. Cultural voices like William Wordsworth and John Ruskin argued that the iron locomotive was an assault on the organic integrity of the landscape and the moral constitution of life. They feared it would poison the air, deafen livestock, and annihilate the silence necessary for spiritual life. The steam panic combined every category of concern we still see today: health, well-being, accident risk, environmental destruction, and social disruption.

The introduction of the sewing machine in the 1840s added a gendered dimension to technological panic. While critics predicted unemployment for seamstresses, they also expressed alarm about the social consequences of women's enhanced economic agency. Because the sewing machine enabled cottage industry, it was perceived as a catalyst for disruptions to established family structures and marriage norms. In this case, the technology was almost incidental to the deeper anxieties about social change.

Similarly, the electric telegraph provoked concerns about the acceleration of information flow eroding leisure time and intensifying work pressures. An early 1900s cartoon depicted people in a park absorbed in telegraphic communication rather than speaking to each other, a scene that looks exactly like modern critiques of people on smartphones. Even the New York Times expressed concern in 1858 that the brevity of telegraphic communication was degrading the standards of written expression, a complaint we now hear about texting and social media platforms.

The introduction of the portable Kodak camera in 1888 inaugurated the first modern privacy panic. The camera-wielding stranger represented a new capacity for unsolicited surveillance. Theodore Roosevelt expressed indignation at being photographed without consent. This directly prefigures our current debates about facial recognition and ambient data collection. The technology changes, but the underlying concern about the erosion of visual privacy and the power asymmetry between the observer and the observed remains the same.

In the twentieth century, we saw panics regarding radio, comic books, and television. A 1941 study concluded that children were severely addicted to radio crime dramas, using the same language of addiction we now apply to video games and social media. The campaign against comic books in the 1950s even led to Congressional hearings based on flawed research that claimed comic books caused juvenile delinquency. Later, the saturation of television sparked concerns about intellectual passivity and shortened attention spans.

Just recently, on Wednesday, March 25, 2026, a Los Angeles jury found both Meta and Google (YouTube) liable for negligence in the design and operation of their platforms. The case centered on a 20-year-old plaintiff, referred to as KGM, who argued that she became addicted to these platforms as a child—starting at age 6 for YouTube and age 9 for Instagram—which exacerbated her mental health struggles. Just one day earlier, on March 24, 2026, a separate jury in New Mexico reached a landmark verdict against Meta. New Mexico successfully argued that Meta knowingly enabled child sexual exploitation on its platforms and concealed its knowledge of the dangers these platforms posed to children's mental health.

As personal computers arrived in the 1980s, we saw the emergence of computer-phobia, with people reporting physical symptoms like nausea and acute anxiety. The Y2K Millenium Bug of the late 1990s showed how a real technical problem can be amplified by media into a crisis of existential proportions, with predictions of infrastructure collapse and civil disorder. Across all these eras, the media acts as a significant amplifier because narratives of threat are intrinsically more newsworthy than accounts of stability. This dynamic over represents alarming accounts and produces a public sphere where risk is persistently overstated.

However, we must also be careful not to fall into reflexive skepticism. Awareness of this historical pattern shouldn't lead us to dismiss all legitimate concerns. History is also full of technologies like lead paint, asbestos, and DDT that were adopted enthusiastically before their harmful consequences were recognized. The goal is to distinguish between genuine severity and mere prevalence. A harm may be severe for a few while remaining rare for the many. Contextualization and proportionality are key. By understanding the history of techno-panics, we can better navigate the current AI revolution without falling into either blind optimism or paralyzed dread.

Sources:

Atkinson, R. D., Castro, D., & McQuinn, A. (2015). How tech populism is undermining innovation. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3066771

Atkinson, R. D., & Moschella, D. (2024). Myth 2: Technology is destroying individual privacy. Technology Fears and Scapegoats, 29-33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52349-6_3

Bell, V. (n.d.). A history of media technology scares, from the printing press to Facebook. Slate Magazine. https://slate.com/technology/2010/02/a-history-of-media-technology-scares-from-the-printing-press-to-facebook.html (paywall)

Derrida, J. (2021) Dissemination. University of Chicago Press

MacGregor, D. G. (2003). Public response to Y2K: Social amplification and risk adaptation: or, “how I learned to stop worrying and love Y2K”. The Social Amplification of Risk, 243-261. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511550461.011

Meta and YouTube designed addictive products that harmed young people, jury finds. (2026, March 25). the Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2026/mar/25/jury-verdict-us-first-social-media-addiction-trial-meta-youtube

Orben, A. (2020) The sisyphean cycle of technology panics. Perspectives of Psychological Science, 15(5), 1143-1157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691620919372

"The Effects of the Telegraph on Literature" published in the New York Times on December 6, 1858.

"The Kodak Fiend," published in the Hawaiian Gazette on December 9, 1890.

Weinberg, S.B. & Fuerst, M.L. (1984) "Computerphobia: How to Slay the Dragon of Computer Fear."

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

Review: The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster, or, the Strait of Hormuz and Lessons from the Dardanelles.

The impeding doom of global trade under Trump as the U.S. Treasury declares the United States insolvent (continuing Trump's bankruptcy of everything he touches) led me to this book in which the British found themselves in a situation remarkably similar to that in which we find ourselves now, (at least as of March 2026).

In the merciless geography of global conflict, maritime choke-points are the ultimate arbiters of imperial survival and economic equilibrium. These narrow corridors are not merely topographical features but high-stakes nodes where military overreach often collides with the fragile machinery of global trade. In 1915, the Dardanelles—a serpentine strait barely a mile wide at its narrows—became the epicenter of such a collision. It was here that the British War Council attempted a strategic masterstroke that ultimately devolved into a masterclass in failure.

The campaign remains the definitive "mismatch of strategic ends and means." The British sought a monumental end—the forced capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, the relief of the Russian front, and the stabilization of global grain markets—but provided means that were initially limited to a "naval-only" demonstration. This logistical fantasy failed to account for the technical parity of land-based artillery and the psychological resilience of the defender. As modern strategists cast a wary eye toward the Strait of Hormuz, the failure at Gallipoli serves as a haunting reminder that a misunderstanding of maritime bottlenecks can trigger a cascading collapse of the international order.

In The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster, Nicholas A. Lambert provides a radical re-interpretation of the campaign, moving beyond the tactical carnage of the beaches to the "crushing complexity" of the Cabinet room. Lambert’s thesis is built upon the "two-edged weapon" of globalized trade, arguing that the drive toward the Dardanelles was propelled less by traditional military expansionism and more by the desperate need to secure Russian wheat. While Lambert follows a long tradition of examining the psychology of high command, he shifts the focus to the intersection of shipping finance and social order.

The British "War Lords" (Asquith, Churchill, and Kitchener) were not operating in a vacuum of pure military strategy; they were reacting to a looming domestic crisis. By 1915, the prospect of bread riots in Britain was a strategic reality. Opening the straits was seen as a way to unlock Russian grain, thereby depressing world prices and ensuring the financial solvency of the Russian Empire.

The catastrophic "So What?" of this period lies in the systemic "strategic narcissism" of the War Council. Fueled by a potent orientalist bias, British planners assumed the Ottoman Empire was an "inefficient and out-of-date" power that would simply collapse upon the sight of a battle fleet. This intellectual failure—the belief that a "second-rate" power lacked the grit to resist a modern navy—led directly to the military failure of March 18. They treated the straits as a hurdle to be cleared rather than a defended fortress, ignoring that global trade security is built as much on the perception of power as on power itself.

The transition from a "naval-only" effort to a "beach-hopping" amphibious disaster illustrates a fatal shift from a deliberative to an implemental mindset. When the naval attempt was shattered by a single line of twenty undetected mines, the War Council did not reassess; they doubled down. This lack of flexibility led to the commitment of nearly 500,000 men to a campaign for which there was no established precedent and, crucially, no joint doctrine.

Planners suffered from a "technological overconfidence," believing naval guns could neutralize mobile shore batteries without ground-based spotters.

There was a systemic underestimation of Ottoman resolve and German technical expertise, assuming the "projectile" (the Turk) would retreat the moment the "propellant" (the British Fleet) appeared.

Perhaps the most egregious error was the lack of any established amphibious doctrine or interservice coordination. The military attempted the most complex operation in history with no joint training, leaving General Ian Hamilton’s staff scattered across ships, unable to command or control the chaos on the beaches.

The Strait of Hormuz is the modern world’s Dardanelles: a geographic bottleneck where the "crushing complexity" of market psychology meets the reality of asymmetric warfare. In 1915, the crisis was one of wheat and credit; today, it is one of petroleum, LNG, and the intricate web of global shipping insurance and perhaps a mix of Epstein fury thrown in for good measure. That Trump is blinded by his ostensible success in Venezuela complicates his view of military strategy and tactics. Couple that with his obsession of oil and the potential for manipulation of the stock market for immediate enormous personal gains and the recipe for disaster becomes more obvious.

1915:

Russian Wheat (critical for British food security and Russian ammunition capital).
Fears of a pan-Islamic uprising in Egypt and India triggered by Ottoman entry into the war.
Floating mines and shore -based artillery
Underestimating an adversary based on perceived cultural or technical inferiority—the "Orientalist Trap"—is the most reliable path to strategic surprise.

2026:

Global Petroleum/LNG/Helium(the "lifeblood" of industrial production, chip manufacturing, and energy markets).
Fears of Iranian sponsored terrorism and nuclear weapons.
Anti-ship cruise missiles, drone swarms, and fast-attack craft designed for sea-denial.
A navy built on assumptions the next war would be like the last. Naval power alone cannot occupy territory.
Overestimating the damage inflicted on asymmetric weaponry.

The historical parallels between the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign and the contemporary tensions in the Strait of Hormuz center on the strategic fragility of "chokepoints" and the asymmetrical challenge of forcing a heavily defended maritime passage. In both instances, a dominant naval power—the British Royal Navy in 1915 and the Western-led coalitions today—confronted the reality that sheer tonnage and technological superiority can be neutralized by geography and low-cost denial assets. The British failure at the Dardanelles was precipitated by an overestimation of battleship diplomacy and a failure to account for mobile shore batteries and sea mines. Similarly, the current stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz reflects a modern "anti-access/area-denial" (A2/AD) reality, where the threat of swarming fast-attack craft, land-based cruise missiles, and sophisticated mine-laying capabilities creates a risk threshold that conventional naval forces struggle to overcome without escalating into full-scale conflict.

Furthermore, both situations illustrate the profound geopolitical consequences of a prolonged maritime deadlock. The Gallipoli disaster was born of a desire to open a supply route to Russia and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war; its failure led to a political crisis in London and a grueling war of attrition. In the Strait of Hormuz, the stalemate is tied to global energy security and the "Tanker War" dynamics that threaten the 20% of the world's petroleum liquids passing through the 21-mile-wide waterway. In both eras, the aggressor or "gatekeeper" (the Ottomans then, regional actors now) utilized the narrowness of the strait to turn the sea into a frontline, proving that control over a few miles of water can dictate the strategic rhythm of a global conflict. The 1915 failure serves as a cautionary tale for modern planners: forcing a strait against an entrenched shore-based adversary remains one of the most perilous undertakings in naval history.

A closure of Hormuz today would mirror the "expectations and perceptions" crisis of 1915. As Nicholas Lambert emphasizes, choke-point crises are as much about credit and confidence as they are about physical blockades. Modern leaders, like Asquith’s Cabinet, would find themselves paralyzed by the interplay of market volatility, shipping finance, and the demand for politically expedient military action. The 1915 experience warns us that economic warfare is a two-edged blade; the disruption to the global financial system often inflicts more damage on the "intervener" than the intended target.

The Gallipoli campaign is not merely a tragedy of the past, but a foundational text for contemporary defense planners. It demonstrates that strategic brilliance in the Cabinet room is a liability if it is not tethered to a realistic assessment of tactical means, or, ignorance of a president, and failure to head the warnings of other states. The role of Israel just complicates matters, preventing any kind of unilateral agreement to avoid catastrophe.

The ghost of the Dardanelles warns us that the price of strategic hubris is always paid in the blood of soldiers and the collapse of global stability. History's lessons are there; they should not be ignored.

Sunday, March 15, 2026

Brendan Carr doesn't understand his own media landscape

Federal Communications Commission Chair Brendan Carr threatened to revoke broadcasters' licenses over coverage of the Iran war, after President Trump accused news outlets of "intentionally misleading" the American public.

Trump criticized print media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, for reporting Friday that Iranian strikes damaged five U.S. Air Force refueling planes in Saudi Arabia. The president said four of the five tanker planes suffered "virtually no damage and are already back in service."

Several ironies here. Whether the tankers were only marginally damaged or not, the fact that Iran could reach them by striking Saudi Arabia should give the president (and everyone else, pause.)

The other irony. Carr reveals he doesn't understand the media he controls. People don't get their news from traditional sources. They get it from everywhere but the Wall Street Journal and NY Times. The final irony is the unintended consequence of the Supreme Court dismantling Chevron Deference. *

Top Social Media Platforms for News: YouTube (62%), Facebook (55%), Instagram (45%), and TikTok (38%).
Digital Dominance: Over half of U.S. adults (52%) prefer digital platforms over TV, radio, or print.
Declining Traditional Media:
While 64% still use television, its influence is waning compared to digital sources.

Top Trusted Sources: The Weather Channel (! LOL) is rated most trustworthy, followed by the BBC and PBS.

Local News: Nearly 90% of Americans get local news digitally via apps, websites, or social media.

Generational Shift: Younger adults (18-29) rely most heavily on social media, with up to 85% of young people using it for news.

Carr has focused a lot of his rhetoric and threats on broadcast licenses for TV networks and local stations, warning that they could “lose their licenses” if they do not “correct course” in their coverage.That approach assumes broadcast outlets are still the central chokepoint for news, even though much political information now flows through platforms (social media, streaming, aggregators) the FCC does not license in the same way.

While Carr has stated that broadcast licenses are "not a property right" and can be revoked for what he deems "news distortions," the actual impact of such a move is limited by how people currently get their information In any case, the FCC does not have the authority to revoke "licenses" for The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, or digital-native outlets, as they do not use the public broadcast spectrum.

Even if the FCC were to successfully target a network like ABC or CBS, it only regulates the local broadcast affiliates (the over-the-air signals). It does not regulate the cable transmissions or the streaming apps (like Paramount+ or Peacock) where many viewers now watch that same content.

The intersection of 20th-century broadcast law and modern digital reality is where Brendan Carr’s strategy meets its steepest hurdles. To understand how he might navigate this, we have to look at the "scarcity" loophole and the massive legal roadblock the Supreme Court just threw in front of federal agencies

The reason the FCC can even talk about removing licenses for "news distortion" while being powerless against a newspaper or a blog comes down to the Scarcity Doctrine. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that because there are only so many frequencies on the radio and TV dial (a "scarce resource"), the government has a right to ensure those frequencies serve the "public interest." This created what legal scholars often call "Junior Varsity" First Amendment rights for broadcasters. Unlike a private citizen or a digital platform, a broadcaster is considered a "proxy" for the public.The FCC's "News Distortion" policy—which Carr is currently invoking—allows the agency to investigate if a station deliberately slants or stages news. However, the bar is incredibly high: you usually need "extrinsic evidence" (like an internal memo from a manager telling a reporter to lie) rather than just a biased-looking broadcast.

Carr has expressed interest in expanding FCC reach to digital platforms by "interpreting" Section 230 (the law that protects social media companies from being sued for what users post). But the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo changed the game in one of those delightful unintended consequences: the end of Chevron Deference. Previously, if a law like the Communications Act was vague, courts would defer to the FCC’s "reasonable" interpretation. Loper Bright killed that. Now, if Carr tries to say, "I’m interpreting the Communications Act to mean the FCC can regulate social media algorithms," the courts will no longer take his word for it. They will look at the text of the law themselves. Legal experts argue that since Section 230 doesn't grant the FCC any explicit enforcement power over social media, Loper Bright makes it nearly impossible for Carr to unilaterally "re-interpret" digital law to match his broadcast powers.

Sources:

* Chevron deference was a legal doctrine arising from the 1984 Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. It established a two-step framework for how courts should review a federal agency's interpretation of a statute. If Congress had not directly addressed the specific issue in the law, courts were required to defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it was "permissible" or "reasonable", even if the court would have reached a different conclusion. This gave agencies like the FCC or EPA significant power to fill in the gaps of broad or ambiguous laws.

N.B. My sources of news. Just as an experiment, as an old (78) person I am listing my sources of news, i.e. what I read regularly, pay for, or watch.

Atlantic Magazine (print and online), The Guardian (online), New Yorker (print and online), Yahoo News (online), USA Today (online), New York Times (online), Washington Post (online), Jacobin (online), New York Review of Books (print and online), New Scientist (print and online), SCOTUSBlog (online), Justia (online), Dorf on Law (online) Verdict (online), YouTube (Heather Cox Richardson, Shipping News, Washington Week, others ad hoc.) I have also found AI (Gemini, Perplexity, and Claude) to be incredibly useful research tools. (I never would have considered looking at the Federalist Society for comments about Loper Bright for example.) Make of all that what you will.

Thursday, March 12, 2026

Shifting Targets

Daily Log: Trump, Rubio, Hegseth & Caine on the Iran War (with some help from Claude)

Beginning February 27, 2026

February 27 — Pre-War

Oman's Foreign Minister announced a diplomatic "breakthrough" with Iran, but no major public statements on war goals were made by the four officials. Negotiations over a new nuclear agreement had failed in February, with mediating Omani officials reporting significant progress and Iran willing to make concessions — but Trump said he was "not thrilled" with the talks.

February 28 — Day 1 (Strikes Begin)

Trump: In an early-morning video posted to Truth Social, Trump announced the beginning of strikes on Iran. When announcing the strikes, he said the U.S. military would destroy Iran's ballistic missile program, prevent the regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and stop Iran's support of military proxy networks. He also strongly implied regime change, calling on the Iranian people to "be bold, be heroic and take back your country."

Israel: Netanyahu said the attacks were being conducted "with the assistance of the United States, my friend, U.S. President Donald Trump, and the U.S. military," describing the joint war as something he had been pushing for decades: "This coalition of forces allows us to do what I have yearned to do for 40 years."

March 1 — Day 2

Trump: In an interview with Axios, Trump said he could "go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days."

March 2 — Day 3

Trump: Laid out four military objectives: destroying Iran's missile capabilities, annihilating its navy, preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and stopping arms flows to proxy groups.

Rubio (on Capitol Hill, briefing congressional leaders — the statement that ignited a firestorm): "We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action against Iran. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces by the Iranian regime. And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties." These were the first time a Trump official had so explicitly acknowledged Israel as a driving force behind the war — landing at a moment when Americans' public support for Israel had hit historic lows.

Hegseth (Pentagon press briefing): Said the U.S. goal was to "destroy the missile threats, destroy the navy, no nukes," and rejected the notion that the conflict would be prolonged or involve nation-building. "We didn't start this war, but under President Trump we're finishing it." Also said: "This is not a so-called regime change war, but the regime sure did change and the world is better off for it."

Caine (same Pentagon briefing): Told reporters that the military objective "will be difficult to achieve and, in some cases, will be difficult and gritty work," and warned: "We expect to take additional losses."

March 3 — Day 4

Trump (meeting German Chancellor Merz in the Oval Office): Flatly contradicted Rubio on Israel's role, telling reporters "No" when asked if Israel forced his hand — and adding, "I might have forced their hand."

Hegseth (on X): Boosted Trump's message immediately, posting: "This is 100% correct."

Rubio (returning to Capitol Hill for House and Senate briefings): Tried to walk back his Monday remarks. He told reporters, "Your statement is false," when asked whether the U.S. got involved because Israel was going to strike Iran. He said: "I told you this had to happen anyway. The president made a decision... that decision had been made." He called the Israel question "a question of timing, of why this had to happen as a joint operation."

Rubio also announced that U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran would increase in intensity going forward.

March 4 — Day 5

Hegseth (Pentagon briefing): Said, "I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury — America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy." He predicted the U.S. and Israel would control Iranian airspace within a week, and said: "We can sustain this fight easily for as long as we need."

Hegseth on Israel's role: Said Iran's attacks on its Gulf neighbors were "pushing those countries in our direction to support this effort, further alienating Iran," and described Iran's behavior as "a demonstration of the desperation of that regime."

Caine: Noted that a U.S. submarine had sunk the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena — the first American submarine sinking of an enemy warship since 1945.

March 5 — Day 6

Trump: Said there are "no time limits" for how long the war would continue.

Hegseth: Stated the war had "only just begun," and said he would not rule out sending American ground troops to Iran.

March 6 — Day 7

Russia/Sanctions: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent revealed that the administration had permitted India to resume buying Russian oil. He also suggested more Russian oil would receive sanctions relief due to the war, saying: "There are hundreds of millions of sanctioned barrels of sanctioned crude on the water. And in essence, by un-sanctioning them, Treasury can create supply."

Senate Democrats reacted sharply. A joint statement signed by Schumer, Warren, Shaheen and others said the administration's move was "particularly galling in light of public reporting that Russia is assisting Iran in targeting Americans in the Middle East," and argued it gave Putin "windfall profits" to continue his war in Ukraine while Iran was actively trying to kill U.S. troops.

March 7 — Day 8

Trump (traveling to Dover Air Force Base for a dignified transfer for six soldiers killed in an Iranian strike in Kuwait): Said the oil price surge was "a small price to pay" for defeating Iran.

Russia/Intelligence: Reports emerged that Russia had provided Iran with information that could help Iranian forces strike American ships, aircraft, and bases in the region, with one U.S. official stating point-blank: "Russia is providing intelligence help to Iran." White House envoy Steve Witkoff said he had communicated to Russian officials that they "shouldn't share any intelligence with Iran."

March 8 — Day 9

Hegseth: On Israel's strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure, Hegseth said "that wasn't our necessary objective," but added that Israel was not leading the U.S. deeper into war. "The president has made clear to those concerns that we're not getting pulled in any direction. We're leading. The president is leading." The administration also privately told Israel it was "not satisfied" with strikes on energy infrastructure and ordered they not be repeated without prior approval.

March 9 — Day 10 — Putin Call

Trump-Putin call: Trump spoke by phone with Putin for the first time since the start of the war. The call was requested by Washington and lasted approximately one hour. Putin's foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov described it as "frank and businesslike" and said Putin presented Trump with "several proposals" for ending the war. The Kremlin described Trump's assessment as being given "in the context of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli operation."

Trump (after the call, at Trump National Doral): Said Putin "was very impressed with what he saw" the U.S. do in Iran, and called it "a military success, the likes of which people haven't seen." He told reporters he had "a very good call with Putin," and said: "He wants to be helpful with Iran. I told him you can be more helpful by ending the war in Ukraine."

Trump on sanctions: Told reporters: "We have sanctions on some countries. We're going to take those sanctions off until this straightens out. Then, who knows, maybe we won't have to put them on — there'll be so much peace." He did not specify which countries. The Kremlin's Dmitry Peskov said sanctions had not been discussed "in any detailed way" on the call.

Trump on war goals: Claimed the U.S. was "achieving major strides toward completing our military objective," and said "some people could say they're pretty well complete." At a House Republican gathering the same day, however, he said "we haven't won enough."

March 10 — Day 11

Hegseth (Pentagon briefing): Narrowed U.S. objectives to three — destroying missile capabilities, destroying the navy, and permanently denying Iran nuclear weapons — and vowed there would be no "mission creep." He declared Tuesday would be "the most intense day of strikes yet," and said: "We do so on our timeline and at our choosing."

Hegseth on Israel: Acknowledged that Israel has its own goals for the conflict. "Israel has been a really strong partner in this effort. Where they have different objectives, they pursued them. Ultimately, we've stayed focused on ours."

Caine: Reported that the U.S. had struck more than 5,000 targets, including underground missile launchers and drone factories. Iranian ballistic missile launches were down 90% and drone attacks down 83%.

March 11 — Day 12

Trump: Told reporters: "We have hit them harder than virtually any country in history has been hit, and we're not finished yet."

White House on Israel: Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said: "The end of American involvement in this conflict will ultimately be determined by the commander in chief when he feels the military objectives have been fully achieved and the threat from the rogue Iranian regime has been completely destroyed." Meanwhile, reporting indicated the White House feared Israel would continue fighting even after the U.S. exits the war — with Israeli officials privately describing the conflict as "Bibi's dream for decades."

Rubio (classified Senate briefing): Democratic Senator Chris Murphy reported that the stated goal appeared to be destroying missiles, boats, and drone factories — but that the question of what happens when the U.S. stops bombing and Iran restarts production went unanswered by administration officials.

The through-line across these 12 days: The administration's three official military objectives (missiles, navy, no nukes) have remained fairly consistent from Hegseth and Caine, but Trump's shifting rhetoric on regime change, the Israeli role controversy ignited and then furiously walked back by Rubio, the easing of Russian oil sanctions even as Moscow was reportedly helping Iran target Americans, and the unresolved question of what comes after the bombing have created a picture of a war with clear tactical goals and no defined political endgame.

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

Endowments and Existential Threats

A couple of years ago I received a call from the University of Pennsylvania, my Alma Mater, wanted a donation to support students at Penn. Note that they always get students to call, never administrators. As it happens, just a few weeks before, I had received the alumni magazine with a pie chart showing the endowment, how much interest had been earned, and how the money was distributed. That year it was a little less than a $billion in interest, but I was astonished to see they were unable to spend all of it. (Note that in 2024 they earned $1.5billion.) I explained to the poor student on the other end of the line to explain to me why they needed money when they couldn't spend all of what they had just earned. He had no clue, but it wasn't his fault and the answer wasn't in his script.

Just a couple years later and the best president ever in the history of the world (his evaluation) decided to go after some mostly Ivy League universities for assorted policies (mostly related to support for non-white students but generally falling into the generic "woke" category -- see below) and punish them by canceling their federal funds used for assorted research, e.g. cancer research, climate, DEI etc. (Table3)

This is a table showing endowment for 2025 and reported interest for 2024 for universities targeted by Trump:

Columbia caved almost immediately, resorting to groveling mode, followed by several others with the exception of Harvard who took the administration to court and won! All this got me thinking about the role of endowments and what they are for. I realize there may be certain restrictions placed on gifts and the general idea is to help maintain the university in perpetuity, i.e. an existential purpose. This is how most universities allocate interest from endowments:

Now, using Columbia as an example, the interest available to them in 2025 to counter Trump's threat was $1.6billion. Now the $400million Trump threaten to cancel, while not peanuts, could easily have been absorbed by the interest earned that year or perhaps taken out of the principal, since it could have been considered an existential threat.

That leads us to some general considerations. The 2025 fiscal year has exposed a profound strategic paradox for the American Ivy League: a period of unprecedented endowment growth occurring alongside escalating, targeted threats to federal research funding. While institutions like Columbia, Penn, and Harvard reported "record-breaking" investment returns, they simultaneously entered a period of heightened institutional insecurity. Under the current political climate, federal support—once a neutral pillar of the research enterprise—has been transformed into a tool for "weaponized federalism." The strategic management of these FY2025 windfalls is no longer merely a fiduciary exercise in capital preservation; it is a matter of national institutional security, i.e. existential.

The massive interest surplus earned this year represents more than a financial triumph; it is a missed opportunity to construct a "fiscal shield" against federal interference. Despite the windfall, leadership remains reactive. Current institutional hesitation to mobilize this liquidity leaves the core mission of free inquiry exposed to administrative coercion. The following analysis details the financial mechanics of this windfall and the urgent necessity of deploying it to insulate these institutions from politically motivated funding volatility.

The 2025 fiscal year was an "uncanny" window of performance, characterized by a tight clustering of returns between 11% and 12.4%. For Harvard, which operates on an 8.0% long-term target (comprising a 5% payout and 3% inflation buffer), the 11.9% return represents a ~3.9% "excess alpha"—a liquid surplus that currently sits untapped for defensive purposes.

Institution	Total Asset Value (AUM) as of June 30, 2025	FY2025 Investment Return	Trailing 10-Year Annualized Return	Budget Supported by Endowment
Columbia	$15.9 Billion	12.4%	7.8%	12%
Penn	$24.8 Billion	12.2%	9.2%	19%
Harvard	$56.9 Billion	11.9%	9.6%*	Nearly 40%

The strategic risk posed by "uncertainty in the funding environment" has transitioned from a theoretical concern to a catastrophic financial liability. We are seeing the emergence of a "liquidity trap" where massive net assets fail to prevent institutional debt increases. Universities find themselves in a trap of their own making. They have left themselves open to federal pressure and coercion by not using their funds to conduct important research but without federal bullying. Universities lust after the money because of the indirect cost overhead which is gravy for the institutions, sometimes as high as 50%.

Penn is a good example. Despite possessing $33.9 billion in total net assets and reporting a "strong operating performance," Penn was forced into a $463 million debt increase. A primary driver was a $175 million federal funding pause initiated by the Trump administration, specifically targeting the University’s policies on transgender athletes. This $175 million withdrawal illustrates the fragility of the research enterprise; Penn remains reliant on federal grants even as its balance sheet swells.

This vulnerability is systemic. Columbia University identifies government grants and contracts as one of its three largest revenue streams. Traditional spending models have proved structurally ill-equipped for weaponized federalism, as they offer no mechanism to instantly pivot endowment liquidity to replace withdrawn federal support. Without a dedicated "fiscal shield," these multi-billion-dollar institutions remain susceptible to being coerced through their research budgets.

Institutional leaders frequently cite "intergenerational duty" and the "Endowment Spending Rule" as barriers to rapid fiscal mobilization. They argue that the 5% payout vs. 3% inflation balance is a legal and ethical mandate that prevents the repurposing of endowment principal.

However, the "principal cannot be repurposed" dogma is increasingly contradicted by market data. Harvard and Columbia point to donor restrictions—legal requirements to follow specific gift instructions—and the rising Federal Endowment Tax as primary inhibitors to liquidity. Yet, the 2025 TIFF/NACUBO reports reveal a significant shift: larger endowments are increasingly utilizing "Special Appropriations." In FY2025, the majority of these specially appropriated funds were directed toward operating budgets. This proves that when institutional survival is at stake, the barrier to mobilization is a matter of governance and political will, not just donor law. The current "passive stewardship" model uses intergenerational duty as a shield for institutional paralysis. And fore-thinking administrators can always encourage donors not to attach any restrictions or requirements to their gifts.

To mitigate the risk of politically motivated interference, administrators must consider academic freedom as an existential requirement. Why not allocate a percentage of interest in high interest yielding years to a fund that would also grow, that could be used to prevent federal intervention? It might include monies for legal defense, contingency research funding, and promotional campaigns to build support for the university's mission and independence. Such resources would signal to policymakers that the institution has the liquidity to maintain autonomy regardless of federal withdrawals.

Ivy League leadership must shift from "passive stewardship" to "active defense." The record returns of fiscal year 2025 are a hollow victory if they are merely reinvested while the university's core mission is eroded by political volatility. If these multi-billion-dollar windfalls are not utilized to insulate the mission of free inquiry now, the long-term "purchasing power" of the endowment will support only a compromised, hollowed-out academic environment. A $56.9 billion endowment is a hollow monument if the research it funds is dictated by the whims of a federal administration. If your mission is important defend it; if not, don't do it.

The university’s autonomy is its most valuable asset; it is time to prove that it is not for sale.

Eric Welch, GFS, '65; Penn,'69

Resources used, all tables are mine as are any errors.

Columbia Finance. "IMC CEO Statement on FY25 Endowment Returns." Columbia University. October 23, 2025.
Columbia University. "Financial Overview | Columbia University in the City of New York.".
Hamlin, Jessica. "Ivy League endowments' uncanny year." PitchBook. November 4, 2025. https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ivy-league-endowments-uncanny-year
Narvekar, N.P. “Narv.” "Harvard Management Company: Message from the Chief Executive Officer." Harvard Management Company. October 2025.
Penn Office of Investments. "About Us | Penn Office of Investments." University of Pennsylvania. https://www.thedp.com/article/2025/09/penn-board-of-trustees-meeting-sept-25
Shaughnessy, Aidan. "Penn Board of Trustees reviews faculty appointments, budget resolutions to end fiscal year 2025." The Daily Pennsylvanian. September 26, 2025.
TIFF Investment Management. "FY2025 NACUBO Results Show Strong Returns but Rising Pressures on Institutions’ Budgets." February 17, 2026.
Yardley, Jonathan. "Comparing Ivy League Endowment Returns." Chief Investment Officer (CIO). November 11, 2025