This is what happens when you read books related to the effects of nuclear war, it's likelihood of happening, and then think about how human intelligence is used. Annie Jacobsen, in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario references John Rubel and Paul Warnke. Fool that I am, I decided I needed to look them up. An experiment with apes came up, used by Warnke as a metaphor for humanity’s foolishness. I have not been reassured by recent breakdowns in technology, apparently the FAA got cobbled back together, and the banking system has been re-soldered but the NSA's downed system is still not working.
We like to cite technology as proof that we have risen above the other animals. Fair enough. No chimpanzee has ever built a machine capable of destroying civilization in an afternoon, then hired a think tank to explain why owning more of them makes everyone safer.
In 1975, foreign-policy adviser and arms-control advocate Paul Warnke called the American-Soviet arms race “Apes on a Treadmill.” Each side ran faster because the other side was running faster. Neither got anywhere, but both accumulated impressive equipment.
The comparison may have been unfair to apes. In a 2007 study of the energy costs of walking, researchers put humans and chimpanzees on treadmills wearing oxygen masks. According to anthropologist David Raichlen, when the chimps had had enough, and perhaps realizing they were going nowhere, they pressed the stop button or jumped off.
American nuclear planners took a different approach. They built the treadmill, accelerated it, and treated the stop button as a threat to national security.
The machinery developed after World War II, when the United States reorganized its defense establishment and discovered that creating offices was much easier than controlling what happened inside them. The Air Force became an independent service in 1947. The Pentagon acquired more administrators, scientific advisers, and technical managers. RAND supplied the intellectual furnishings: a place where exceptionally clever people could turn the end of the world into a problem in applied mathematics.
There were sensible reasons to coordinate military planning and recruit scientific expertise. Unfortunately, expertise came bundled with the conviction that elected officials were amateurs meddling in a professional undertaking. The professionals would decide how to fight the war. The president could announce that one had begun and try not to touch anything.
John Rubel, a senior civilian defense official, recalled Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay explaining the arrangement with unusual clarity: “What does a politician know about war?” The president’s useful contribution was to tell the military there was a war. “We’ll take care of the rest.” Given what “the rest” involved, not to mention bone spurs, this was not altogether reassuring.
Another general, Laurence Kuter, reportedly reacted to the news that warning systems would not automatically launch missiles without presidential intervention by saying, “In that case, we might as well surrender now.” Apparently, the interval between detecting Armageddon and causing it was an intolerable bureaucratic delay. “President Ronald Reagan was shocked to find out he only had a few minutes to make a decision, while President George W. Bush lamented that he did not have enough time to finish using the restroom before he would have to authorize a launch order.” [Owens]
Eisenhower warned about both the military-industrial complex and the danger of public policy becoming captive to a scientific-technological elite. He had spent eight years supervising the enterprise and evidently thought the owners deserved a warning label.
Rubel found the underlying logic illustrated by a crater he visited in France. During World War I, opposing armies had tunneled beneath a contested position and packed the ground with explosives. Eventually, something set them off, destroying soldiers and terrain together. Each side had pursued a rational military advantage. Collectively, they had manufactured a hole.
Nuclear strategy offered the same service on a more ambitious scale.
Consider the early Minuteman missile system. Its solid-fuel rockets could launch almost immediately, an achievement advertised as essential to deterrence. Rubel observed that this also made them handy for a surprise first strike. A weapon does not become exclusively defensive because the brochure says so.
The launch controls were especially instructive. According to Rubel’s account, early designs allowed a squadron’s missiles to fire together or in a staggered sequence. Once the sequence began, however, it could not be stopped. A cease-fire order arriving halfway through would be an interesting historical document for whoever remained to read it.
An emergency timer, intended to allow a surviving launch-control center to act if the others were destroyed, presented another little surprise. Rubel had understood that it would impose a substantial delay. He learned that it could instead be set to zero. The designers had thoughtfully provided an emergency mechanism for eliminating the time needed to determine whether there was an emergency.
Investigators also identified electrical vulnerabilities involving switching mechanisms that could respond to stray pulses. In Rubel’s telling, power disturbances threatened to become launch instructions. Civilization had placed considerable faith in the ability of its wiring to distinguish a presidential order from an electrical hiccup.
Correcting these problems required a prolonged struggle with an Air Force hierarchy that resisted civilian interference with remarkable stamina. The missiles could move almost instantly. Safety improvements took rather longer.
The hardware reflected the war plan. In December 1960, officials assembled at Strategic Air Command headquarters for a briefing on SIOP-62, the first Single Integrated Operational Plan. Its purpose was to coordinate American nuclear forces. It accomplished this by organizing an enormous attack on the Soviet Union, China, and associated targets, with very little room for the president to request a smaller apocalypse.
The presentation was suitably theatrical. Plastic overlays descended across huge maps, displaying successive waves of nuclear strikes. Bombers, missiles, targets, yields: everything had its place. People mostly appeared later, in the casualty estimates.
Those estimates ran into the hundreds of millions.
General Thomas Power supplied occasional levity. Of a radar station in Albania, he remarked, “I just hope none of you have any relatives in Albania,” because it lay along the attack route and would be destroyed. Albania had achieved the strategic distinction of being in the way.
When someone asked about sparing China in a war confined to the Soviet Union, Power acknowledged that it could be done but hoped nobody would request it: “It would really screw up the plan.”
One appreciates the inconvenience. Reworking the paperwork to avoid killing hundreds of millions of uninvolved people would have been a nuisance.
Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup offered a less sophisticated assessment: “Any plan that murders three hundred million Chinese when it might not even be their war is not a good plan.”
Rubel later compared the briefing’s bureaucratic atmosphere to the Wannsee Conference. His point was the spectacle of capable officials discussing mass death with disciplined attention to procedure and remarkably little resistance to the premise.
The 1961 Berlin crisis exposed the practical drawback of having one magnificent plan for everything. Kennedy needed choices. His military machinery offered something closer to a light switch.
Civilian strategists tried to devise alternatives, including a proposed first strike against Soviet nuclear forces. Calling it “counterforce” gave the proposal a pleasantly technical finish, though it did not remove the civilians living near the targets. Kennedy’s adviser Ted Sorensen reportedly greeted one such presentation with, “You’re crazy! We shouldn’t let guys like you around here.”
Eventually, civilian officials managed to force changes. Marvin Stern, who oversaw strategic-warfare matters, sought advice from Pentagon general counsel Cyrus Vance about overcoming Air Force resistance. Vance’s reported guidance was admirably free of administrative ornament: “Anything you can get away with.”
Stern suspended Minuteman funding for a month. Selective-launch features, previously represented as technically impossible, became achievable with impressive speed. Apparently, the relevant breakthrough was in accounting.
The missiles acquired more flexible controls, and subsequent war planning gave presidents additional options. The stop button had not violated the laws of physics after all. It had merely offended institutional preference.
That brings me back to David Raichlen’s 2007 laboratory experiment published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. When five chimpanzees and four humans were placed on treadmills with oxygen masks to measure energy expenditure, it was the primates who demonstrated true behavioral intelligence. When the exercise proved exhausting and futile, the apes did not rationalize the exertion, nor did they construct complex game-theoretic models to justify running until collapse. They simply pressed the stop button or jumped off the machine.
Human strategic elites, by contrast, leveraged their advanced intellect to construct an accelerating treadmill of global annihilation, locked the speed to maximum, removed the emergency brake, and spent years fighting civilian authority to ensure the machine could never be stopped. Despite all our supercomputers, game theory, and multi-megaton arsenals, human civilization remains trapped on an accelerating treadmill of its own design—too arrogant to admit the madness of the run, and too foolish to simply hit the stop button.
The chimpanzees, meanwhile, required neither a presidential directive nor a funding suspension. They decided they had run enough and got off.
We remain very proud of our superior intelligence.
Sources:
Owens, Jesse , How to launch a nuclear weapon. (n.d.). Outrider. October, 2020 https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/how-launch-nuclear-weapon
Kaplan, F. (2020). The bomb: Presidents, generals, and the secret history of nuclear war. Simon & Schuster.
-- (1983) Wizards of Armageddon, Stanford University Press.
Rubel, J. H. (2008). Doomsday delayed: USAF strategic weapons doctrine and SIOP-62, 1959-1962 : Two cautionary tales. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC. https://www.si.edu/media/NASM/NASM-DoomsdayDelayed.pdf
Warnke, Paul C. "Apes on a Treadmill" . Foreign Policy, Spring, 1975. No. 18, pps 12-29 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147960
A recent movie about the onset of nuclear war is titled A House of Dynamite. Released in 2025 and directed by Kathryn Bigelow, the film dramatizes the tense, real-time responses of U.S. government and military officials following an unattributed ICBM launch at the United States. It does not end well.