Since the Dobbs decision, we’ve been forced back into a massive national debate over some really old court rulings. It’s gotten to the point where people are questioning the basic foundation of how our courts work and how we keep society stable. I’m talking about stare decisis—the legal principle of standing by past decisions. For the longest time, most people just took precedent for granted as a settled, slightly boring part of the legal system. Now, it’s a total political lightning rod.
The real tension today isn't just a debate over whether a specific case like Roe v. Wade or Miranda v. Arizona was right or wrong when it was decided. Instead, the question has become much more fundamental: is following precedent a mandatory constitutional requirement built into the very DNA of our government, or is it just a convenient policy that judges can toss aside whenever the political winds shift? Should cases like Plessy, Dred Scott, Griswold, or Brown be considered permanent law?
Honestly, how someone answers that question usually depends entirely on what they are trying to achieve politically in the moment. But the answer we ultimately land on will determine whether our legal system remains a reliable anchor or just becomes entirely unpredictable.
Discussions about this are endless and go back decades without any real resolution. I pulled a couple of contrasting views to get a flavor of the debate: Michael Paulsen vs. Richard Fallon. Which one you find convincing usually depends entirely on your political views.
Paulsen basically thinks that because the Constitution doesn’t explicitly use the words stare decisis, the whole concept is just a sub-constitutional judicial policy. To him, it’s not a fundamental pillar of law, just a secondary tool. His logic is deceptively simple: if the Constitution is the supreme law, and a past court made a mistake interpreting it, then following that mistake actually violates a judge's oath. Paulsen goes a step further, suggesting that since this is just a policy, Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass a law abolishing it. He’s pretty open about his strategic motives here. He isn't just looking for a theoretical debate; he wants to dismantle abortion rights. He’s suggested that Congress could pass a law telling the Supreme Court to ignore precedent specifically in abortion cases. It’s a selective repeal strategy that treats the law like a light switch the legislature can flip whenever they don't like how judges are reading the map.
But when you start calling a foundational principle like precedent a mere policy, you open a massive can of worms regarding what "judicial power" actually means. Professor Richard Fallon’s rebuttal is a great defense of the constitutional status quo. Fallon argues that Article III’s grant of judicial power isn't just an empty vessel for whatever the current majority wants to do. He says the authority to rely on precedent is inherently baked into that power. He points back to the very beginning of the republic to show this wasn't some later invention. Even Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, argued that to avoid arbitrary court decisions, it is absolutely indispensable that judges be bound down by strict rules and precedents. Hamilton’s point was that without these rules, a judge is just a politician in a robe. Fallon builds on this by noting that judicial power also includes the power to make judgments final. If Congress can't pass a law to reopen a final judgment between two parties—which is a settled rule in our system—then they definitely shouldn't be able to reach into a judge’s chambers and dictate how they think.
The irony of Paulsen’s Necessary and Proper Clause argument is pretty wild when you look at the strategy. Fallon points out a glaring logical trap: if Congress really has the power to tell the Court to give less weight to precedent, wouldn't they also have the power to tell them to give it absolute weight? Imagine if Congress passed a law saying the Court could never overrule a past decision, even if it was obviously a disaster. That would be just as much of an unconstitutional power grab as Paulsen’s proposal. It would completely interfere with the core function of the judiciary to say what the law is, a principle established all the way back in Marbury v. Madison. By trying to pluck out the thread of stare decisis, Paulsen isn't just changing a policy; he’s trying to redefine the very nature of the judicial branch. While Congress can change things like standing requirements—who gets to bring a lawsuit—they cannot tell the Court how to interpret the core meaning of the Constitution itself.
It’s always fascinating to see how political goals dictate whether a commentator suddenly loves or hates the idea of following old rules. This is where the strategic masks usually slip. When a previous decision is something you hate, you call it a mere policy judgment that isn't an "inexorable command." You see this with some originalists who view stare decisis as a hurdle keeping them from getting back to the "true" 1787 meaning of the text. But when the decision is something you want to keep, suddenly that exact same doctrine is a fundamental pillar of law and the ballast keeping the ship from capsizing. We saw this play out in the Casey decision, where the Court admitted that while some Justices might personally dislike a prior ruling, the costs of overruling it were simply too high for the rule of law to bear. The truth is, stare decisis is often used as a shield when you’re winning and dismissed as a nuisance when you’re losing. But if we treat it as something we can switch off for "special" cases like abortion, we run into what Fallon calls the interwoven strands problem. Constitutional doctrines aren't isolated islands; they are a fabric. If you pull the thread on abortion rights, you’re also pulling on substantive due process, which is the same thread holding up the idea that the Bill of Rights applies to the states, or that the federal government must provide equal protection.
This brings us to a really uncomfortable truth about legal legitimacy. Why do we actually follow these rules in the first place? If you ask an originalist, they’ll say it’s because we all consented to the written Constitution back in 1787. But Fallon points out the obvious flaw most people ignore: none of us were alive then. We haven't actually given our active consent to be governed by people who have been dead for two centuries. Instead, the legitimacy of our entire system rests on something much more fluid and, frankly, fragile: widespread acceptance and reasonable justice. We follow the law because we accept the system as it works today. Stare decisis is the glue for this acceptance. It creates a sense of continuity that allows us to go about our lives without wondering if the entire legal order will be reinvented every Tuesday morning. It keeps the law from becoming a series of disconnected, arbitrary lurches from one political extreme to another.
If we were to follow Paulsen’s path and enter a world where precedent no longer matters, we wouldn't just be debating one or two controversial cases. We would be inviting total legal chaos. Fallon is very clear about the "so what?" of this debate. If every single legal question was suddenly up for grabs because precedent is just a "policy," the burden on the Court and the country would be overwhelming. We’d have to re-litigate whether the Bill of Rights even applies to the states. We’d have to question whether the "one-person, one-vote" rule is valid or if it was just a mistake by a past Court. We’d even have to wonder if the regulatory agencies running our economy are allowed under the separation of powers. No country could survive having to rethink its foundational principles in every single case. We would be trading a stable, if imperfect, legal system for a never-ending cycle of constitutional crises where nothing is ever truly settled.
Even the idea of a selective repeal—just getting rid of stare decisis for abortion cases—is blatantly unconstitutional because it’s a direct attempt to force a specific outcome. It isn't a neutral effort to get the law right; it’s a command to the Court to ignore the rules that support one side while leaving the other side’s arsenal intact. Once you recognize that stare decisis has constitutional weight, any attempt by Congress to selectively dismantle it is just raw political power over the law. Congress has plenty of ways to express disagreement with the Court—they can pass resolutions, file amicus briefs, or pass new legislation to trigger a challenge—but they cannot direct the Court to completely ignore constitutional considerations.
To see what a current justice might think about this, Amy Coney Barrett’s writing explores this principle-versus-policy debate within the context of the Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings. She argues that the Court’s weak presumption against overruling its own past decisions isn't a flaw, but a necessary tool for managing disagreements among justices who have fundamentally different visions of the Constitution. By placing a heavy burden of proof on anyone who wants to overturn a case, the doctrine ensures that a new majority can't just impose its will through votes alone—they have to provide a compelling, reasoned defense for unsettling the law. Furthermore, Barrett highlights that stability is maintained by other systemic features, like vertical stare decisis (lower courts following higher courts) and the certiorari process, which keep "superprecedents" and well-settled laws from being constantly challenged. Ultimately, her view of the law is both realistic and practical. It allows for constitutional thought to evolve while protecting the basic continuity of the American legal system.
There were several references to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v Coronado (1932) in which he proposed a ringing endorsement of adhering to precedent:
"...Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because, in most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has repeatedly overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."
"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."
In the end, we are left with a sobering thought that every strategist and citizen needs to reckon with. Our entire constitutional order doesn't rest on a solid, unchanging rock of absolute truth. Instead, as Fallon so eloquently puts it, it rests on the potentially shifting sands of acceptance and reasonable justice. Stare decisis isn't a perfect doctrine, and it isn't an absolute rule that can never be broken. Even its strongest defenders acknowledge that some decisions are so misguided they have to go. But it is the best tool we have to prevent the law from becoming nothing more than a reflection of whoever happens to be in power at the moment. As much as we might wish for a more permanent foundation, the reality is that the law only works as long as we all agree to stand by what has been decided. Without that commitment to continuity, the fabric of our legal system doesn't just fray—it completely and irrevocably unravels.
Sources:
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S1-7-2-2/ALDE_00013237/%5B%27article%27,%20%272%27,%20%27branch%27,%20%27powers%27%5D. This is an annotated explanation of Article III. Section 1.
Aiken, Charles. Stare Decisis, Precedent, and the Constitution. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar., 1956), pp. 87-92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/443254
Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711 (2013). https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Barrett.pdf
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/285/393/
Fallon, Richard. Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology. New York Law Review, 08. 2018 https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-76-2-Fallon.pdf
Paulsen, Michael Stokes. Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1538 n.8 (2000) http://www.jstor.org/stable/797601
N.B. As our current president does everything he can to mold the law to his own purposes, and the legislature has abandoned any semblance of participation in government, it may be that judicial adherence to stare decisis may be the only saving grace to democracy.