Welch's Rarebits (cont.)

Sunday, March 15, 2026

Brendan Carr doesn't understand his own media landscape

Federal Communications Commission Chair Brendan Carr threatened to revoke broadcasters' licenses over coverage of the Iran war, after President Trump accused news outlets of "intentionally misleading" the American public.

Trump criticized print media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, for reporting Friday that Iranian strikes damaged five U.S. Air Force refueling planes in Saudi Arabia. The president said four of the five tanker planes suffered "virtually no damage and are already back in service."

Several ironies here. Whether the tankers were only marginally damaged or not, the fact that Iran could reach them by striking Saudi Arabia should give the president (and everyone else, pause.)

The other irony. Carr reveals he doesn't understand the media he controls. People don't get their news from traditional sources. They get it from everywhere but the Wall Street Journal and NY Times. The final irony is the unintended consequence of the Supreme Court dismantling Chevron Deference. *

Top Social Media Platforms for News: YouTube (62%), Facebook (55%), Instagram (45%), and TikTok (38%).
Digital Dominance: Over half of U.S. adults (52%) prefer digital platforms over TV, radio, or print.
Declining Traditional Media:
While 64% still use television, its influence is waning compared to digital sources.

Top Trusted Sources: The Weather Channel (! LOL) is rated most trustworthy, followed by the BBC and PBS.

Local News: Nearly 90% of Americans get local news digitally via apps, websites, or social media.

Generational Shift: Younger adults (18-29) rely most heavily on social media, with up to 85% of young people using it for news.

Carr has focused a lot of his rhetoric and threats on broadcast licenses for TV networks and local stations, warning that they could “lose their licenses” if they do not “correct course” in their coverage.That approach assumes broadcast outlets are still the central chokepoint for news, even though much political information now flows through platforms (social media, streaming, aggregators) the FCC does not license in the same way.

While Carr has stated that broadcast licenses are "not a property right" and can be revoked for what he deems "news distortions," the actual impact of such a move is limited by how people currently get their information In any case, the FCC does not have the authority to revoke "licenses" for The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, or digital-native outlets, as they do not use the public broadcast spectrum.

Even if the FCC were to successfully target a network like ABC or CBS, it only regulates the local broadcast affiliates (the over-the-air signals). It does not regulate the cable transmissions or the streaming apps (like Paramount+ or Peacock) where many viewers now watch that same content.

The intersection of 20th-century broadcast law and modern digital reality is where Brendan Carr’s strategy meets its steepest hurdles. To understand how he might navigate this, we have to look at the "scarcity" loophole and the massive legal roadblock the Supreme Court just threw in front of federal agencies

The reason the FCC can even talk about removing licenses for "news distortion" while being powerless against a newspaper or a blog comes down to the Scarcity Doctrine. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that because there are only so many frequencies on the radio and TV dial (a "scarce resource"), the government has a right to ensure those frequencies serve the "public interest." This created what legal scholars often call "Junior Varsity" First Amendment rights for broadcasters. Unlike a private citizen or a digital platform, a broadcaster is considered a "proxy" for the public.The FCC's "News Distortion" policy—which Carr is currently invoking—allows the agency to investigate if a station deliberately slants or stages news. However, the bar is incredibly high: you usually need "extrinsic evidence" (like an internal memo from a manager telling a reporter to lie) rather than just a biased-looking broadcast.

Carr has expressed interest in expanding FCC reach to digital platforms by "interpreting" Section 230 (the law that protects social media companies from being sued for what users post). But the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo changed the game in one of those delightful unintended consequences: the end of Chevron Deference. Previously, if a law like the Communications Act was vague, courts would defer to the FCC’s "reasonable" interpretation. Loper Bright killed that. Now, if Carr tries to say, "I’m interpreting the Communications Act to mean the FCC can regulate social media algorithms," the courts will no longer take his word for it. They will look at the text of the law themselves. Legal experts argue that since Section 230 doesn't grant the FCC any explicit enforcement power over social media, Loper Bright makes it nearly impossible for Carr to unilaterally "re-interpret" digital law to match his broadcast powers.

Sources:

* Chevron deference was a legal doctrine arising from the 1984 Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. It established a two-step framework for how courts should review a federal agency's interpretation of a statute. If Congress had not directly addressed the specific issue in the law, courts were required to defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it was "permissible" or "reasonable", even if the court would have reached a different conclusion. This gave agencies like the FCC or EPA significant power to fill in the gaps of broad or ambiguous laws.

N.B. My sources of news. Just as an experiment, as an old (78) person I am listing my sources of news, i.e. what I read regularly, pay for, or watch.

Atlantic Magazine (print and online), The Guardian (online), New Yorker (print and online), Yahoo News (online), USA Todayv (online), New York Times (online), Washington Post (online), Jacobin (online), New York Review of Books (print and online), New Scientist (print and online), SCOTUSBlog (online), Justia (online), Dorf on Law (online0 Verdict (online), YouTube (Heather Cox Richardson, Shipping News, Washington Week, others ad hoc. I have also found AI (Gemini, Perplexity, and Claude to be incredibly useful research tools. (I never would have considered looking at the Federalist Society for comments about Loper Bright for example) Make of all that what you will.

Thursday, March 12, 2026

Shifting Targets

Daily Log: Trump, Rubio, Hegseth & Caine on the Iran War (with some help from Claude)

Beginning February 27, 2026

February 27 — Pre-War

Oman's Foreign Minister announced a diplomatic "breakthrough" with Iran, but no major public statements on war goals were made by the four officials. Negotiations over a new nuclear agreement had failed in February, with mediating Omani officials reporting significant progress and Iran willing to make concessions — but Trump said he was "not thrilled" with the talks.

February 28 — Day 1 (Strikes Begin)

Trump: In an early-morning video posted to Truth Social, Trump announced the beginning of strikes on Iran. When announcing the strikes, he said the U.S. military would destroy Iran's ballistic missile program, prevent the regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and stop Iran's support of military proxy networks. He also strongly implied regime change, calling on the Iranian people to "be bold, be heroic and take back your country."

Israel: Netanyahu said the attacks were being conducted "with the assistance of the United States, my friend, U.S. President Donald Trump, and the U.S. military," describing the joint war as something he had been pushing for decades: "This coalition of forces allows us to do what I have yearned to do for 40 years."

March 1 — Day 2

Trump: In an interview with Axios, Trump said he could "go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days."

March 2 — Day 3

Trump: Laid out four military objectives: destroying Iran's missile capabilities, annihilating its navy, preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and stopping arms flows to proxy groups.

Rubio (on Capitol Hill, briefing congressional leaders — the statement that ignited a firestorm): "We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action against Iran. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces by the Iranian regime. And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties." These were the first time a Trump official had so explicitly acknowledged Israel as a driving force behind the war — landing at a moment when Americans' public support for Israel had hit historic lows.

Hegseth (Pentagon press briefing): Said the U.S. goal was to "destroy the missile threats, destroy the navy, no nukes," and rejected the notion that the conflict would be prolonged or involve nation-building. "We didn't start this war, but under President Trump we're finishing it." Also said: "This is not a so-called regime change war, but the regime sure did change and the world is better off for it."

Caine (same Pentagon briefing): Told reporters that the military objective "will be difficult to achieve and, in some cases, will be difficult and gritty work," and warned: "We expect to take additional losses."

March 3 — Day 4

Trump (meeting German Chancellor Merz in the Oval Office): Flatly contradicted Rubio on Israel's role, telling reporters "No" when asked if Israel forced his hand — and adding, "I might have forced their hand."

Hegseth (on X): Boosted Trump's message immediately, posting: "This is 100% correct."

Rubio (returning to Capitol Hill for House and Senate briefings): Tried to walk back his Monday remarks. He told reporters, "Your statement is false," when asked whether the U.S. got involved because Israel was going to strike Iran. He said: "I told you this had to happen anyway. The president made a decision... that decision had been made." He called the Israel question "a question of timing, of why this had to happen as a joint operation."

Rubio also announced that U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran would increase in intensity going forward.

March 4 — Day 5

Hegseth (Pentagon briefing): Said, "I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury — America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy." He predicted the U.S. and Israel would control Iranian airspace within a week, and said: "We can sustain this fight easily for as long as we need."

Hegseth on Israel's role: Said Iran's attacks on its Gulf neighbors were "pushing those countries in our direction to support this effort, further alienating Iran," and described Iran's behavior as "a demonstration of the desperation of that regime."

Caine: Noted that a U.S. submarine had sunk the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena — the first American submarine sinking of an enemy warship since 1945.

March 5 — Day 6

Trump: Said there are "no time limits" for how long the war would continue.

Hegseth: Stated the war had "only just begun," and said he would not rule out sending American ground troops to Iran.

March 6 — Day 7

Russia/Sanctions: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent revealed that the administration had permitted India to resume buying Russian oil. He also suggested more Russian oil would receive sanctions relief due to the war, saying: "There are hundreds of millions of sanctioned barrels of sanctioned crude on the water. And in essence, by un-sanctioning them, Treasury can create supply."

Senate Democrats reacted sharply. A joint statement signed by Schumer, Warren, Shaheen and others said the administration's move was "particularly galling in light of public reporting that Russia is assisting Iran in targeting Americans in the Middle East," and argued it gave Putin "windfall profits" to continue his war in Ukraine while Iran was actively trying to kill U.S. troops.

March 7 — Day 8

Trump (traveling to Dover Air Force Base for a dignified transfer for six soldiers killed in an Iranian strike in Kuwait): Said the oil price surge was "a small price to pay" for defeating Iran.

Russia/Intelligence: Reports emerged that Russia had provided Iran with information that could help Iranian forces strike American ships, aircraft, and bases in the region, with one U.S. official stating point-blank: "Russia is providing intelligence help to Iran." White House envoy Steve Witkoff said he had communicated to Russian officials that they "shouldn't share any intelligence with Iran."

March 8 — Day 9

Hegseth: On Israel's strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure, Hegseth said "that wasn't our necessary objective," but added that Israel was not leading the U.S. deeper into war. "The president has made clear to those concerns that we're not getting pulled in any direction. We're leading. The president is leading." The administration also privately told Israel it was "not satisfied" with strikes on energy infrastructure and ordered they not be repeated without prior approval.

March 9 — Day 10 — Putin Call

Trump-Putin call: Trump spoke by phone with Putin for the first time since the start of the war. The call was requested by Washington and lasted approximately one hour. Putin's foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov described it as "frank and businesslike" and said Putin presented Trump with "several proposals" for ending the war. The Kremlin described Trump's assessment as being given "in the context of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli operation."

Trump (after the call, at Trump National Doral): Said Putin "was very impressed with what he saw" the U.S. do in Iran, and called it "a military success, the likes of which people haven't seen." He told reporters he had "a very good call with Putin," and said: "He wants to be helpful with Iran. I told him you can be more helpful by ending the war in Ukraine."

Trump on sanctions: Told reporters: "We have sanctions on some countries. We're going to take those sanctions off until this straightens out. Then, who knows, maybe we won't have to put them on — there'll be so much peace." He did not specify which countries. The Kremlin's Dmitry Peskov said sanctions had not been discussed "in any detailed way" on the call.

Trump on war goals: Claimed the U.S. was "achieving major strides toward completing our military objective," and said "some people could say they're pretty well complete." At a House Republican gathering the same day, however, he said "we haven't won enough."

March 10 — Day 11

Hegseth (Pentagon briefing): Narrowed U.S. objectives to three — destroying missile capabilities, destroying the navy, and permanently denying Iran nuclear weapons — and vowed there would be no "mission creep." He declared Tuesday would be "the most intense day of strikes yet," and said: "We do so on our timeline and at our choosing."

Hegseth on Israel: Acknowledged that Israel has its own goals for the conflict. "Israel has been a really strong partner in this effort. Where they have different objectives, they pursued them. Ultimately, we've stayed focused on ours."

Caine: Reported that the U.S. had struck more than 5,000 targets, including underground missile launchers and drone factories. Iranian ballistic missile launches were down 90% and drone attacks down 83%.

March 11 — Day 12

Trump: Told reporters: "We have hit them harder than virtually any country in history has been hit, and we're not finished yet."

White House on Israel: Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said: "The end of American involvement in this conflict will ultimately be determined by the commander in chief when he feels the military objectives have been fully achieved and the threat from the rogue Iranian regime has been completely destroyed." Meanwhile, reporting indicated the White House feared Israel would continue fighting even after the U.S. exits the war — with Israeli officials privately describing the conflict as "Bibi's dream for decades."

Rubio (classified Senate briefing): Democratic Senator Chris Murphy reported that the stated goal appeared to be destroying missiles, boats, and drone factories — but that the question of what happens when the U.S. stops bombing and Iran restarts production went unanswered by administration officials.

The through-line across these 12 days: The administration's three official military objectives (missiles, navy, no nukes) have remained fairly consistent from Hegseth and Caine, but Trump's shifting rhetoric on regime change, the Israeli role controversy ignited and then furiously walked back by Rubio, the easing of Russian oil sanctions even as Moscow was reportedly helping Iran target Americans, and the unresolved question of what comes after the bombing have created a picture of a war with clear tactical goals and no defined political endgame.

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

Endowments and Existential Threats

A couple of years ago I received a call from the University of Pennsylvania, my Alma Mater, wanted a donation to support students at Penn. Note that they always get students to call, never administrators. As it happens, just a few weeks before, I had received the alumni magazine with a pie chart showing the endowment, how much interest had been earned, and how the money was distributed. That year it was a little less than a $billion in interest, but I was astonished to see they were unable to spend all of it. (Note that in 2024 they earned $1.5billion.) I explained to the poor student on the other end of the line to explain to me why they needed money when they couldn't spend all of what they had just earned. He had no clue, but it wasn't his fault and the answer wasn't in his script.

Just a couple years later and the best president ever in the history of the world (his evaluation) decided to go after some mostly Ivy League universities for assorted policies (mostly related to support for non-white students but generally falling into the generic "woke" category -- see below) and punish them by canceling their federal funds used for assorted research, e.g. cancer research, climate, DEI etc. (Table3)

This is a table showing endowment for 2025 and reported interest for 2024 for universities targeted by Trump:

Columbia caved almost immediately, resorting to groveling mode, followed by several others with the exception of Harvard who took the administration to court and won! All this got me thinking about the role of endowments and what they are for. I realize there may be certain restrictions placed on gifts and the general idea is to help maintain the university in perpetuity, i.e. an existential purpose. This is how most universities allocate interest from endowments:

Now, using Columbia as an example, the interest available to them in 2025 to counter Trump's threat was $1.6billion. Now the $400million Trump threaten to cancel, while not peanuts, could easily have been absorbed by the interest earned that year or perhaps taken out of the principal, since it could have been considered an existential threat.

That leads us to some general considerations. The 2025 fiscal year has exposed a profound strategic paradox for the American Ivy League: a period of unprecedented endowment growth occurring alongside escalating, targeted threats to federal research funding. While institutions like Columbia, Penn, and Harvard reported "record-breaking" investment returns, they simultaneously entered a period of heightened institutional insecurity. Under the current political climate, federal support—once a neutral pillar of the research enterprise—has been transformed into a tool for "weaponized federalism." The strategic management of these FY2025 windfalls is no longer merely a fiduciary exercise in capital preservation; it is a matter of national institutional security, i.e. existential.

The massive interest surplus earned this year represents more than a financial triumph; it is a missed opportunity to construct a "fiscal shield" against federal interference. Despite the windfall, leadership remains reactive. Current institutional hesitation to mobilize this liquidity leaves the core mission of free inquiry exposed to administrative coercion. The following analysis details the financial mechanics of this windfall and the urgent necessity of deploying it to insulate these institutions from politically motivated funding volatility.

The 2025 fiscal year was an "uncanny" window of performance, characterized by a tight clustering of returns between 11% and 12.4%. For Harvard, which operates on an 8.0% long-term target (comprising a 5% payout and 3% inflation buffer), the 11.9% return represents a ~3.9% "excess alpha"—a liquid surplus that currently sits untapped for defensive purposes.

Institution	Total Asset Value (AUM) as of June 30, 2025	FY2025 Investment Return	Trailing 10-Year Annualized Return	Budget Supported by Endowment
Columbia	$15.9 Billion	12.4%	7.8%	12%
Penn	$24.8 Billion	12.2%	9.2%	19%
Harvard	$56.9 Billion	11.9%	9.6%*	Nearly 40%

The strategic risk posed by "uncertainty in the funding environment" has transitioned from a theoretical concern to a catastrophic financial liability. We are seeing the emergence of a "liquidity trap" where massive net assets fail to prevent institutional debt increases. Universities find themselves in a trap of their own making. They have left themselves open to federal pressure and coercion by not using their funds to conduct important research but without federal bullying. Universities lust after the money because of the indirect cost overhead which is gravy for the institutions, sometimes as high as 50%.

Penn is a good example. Despite possessing $33.9 billion in total net assets and reporting a "strong operating performance," Penn was forced into a $463 million debt increase. A primary driver was a $175 million federal funding pause initiated by the Trump administration, specifically targeting the University’s policies on transgender athletes. This $175 million withdrawal illustrates the fragility of the research enterprise; Penn remains reliant on federal grants even as its balance sheet swells.

This vulnerability is systemic. Columbia University identifies government grants and contracts as one of its three largest revenue streams. Traditional spending models have proved structurally ill-equipped for weaponized federalism, as they offer no mechanism to instantly pivot endowment liquidity to replace withdrawn federal support. Without a dedicated "fiscal shield," these multi-billion-dollar institutions remain susceptible to being coerced through their research budgets.

Institutional leaders frequently cite "intergenerational duty" and the "Endowment Spending Rule" as barriers to rapid fiscal mobilization. They argue that the 5% payout vs. 3% inflation balance is a legal and ethical mandate that prevents the repurposing of endowment principal.

However, the "principal cannot be repurposed" dogma is increasingly contradicted by market data. Harvard and Columbia point to donor restrictions—legal requirements to follow specific gift instructions—and the rising Federal Endowment Tax as primary inhibitors to liquidity. Yet, the 2025 TIFF/NACUBO reports reveal a significant shift: larger endowments are increasingly utilizing "Special Appropriations." In FY2025, the majority of these specially appropriated funds were directed toward operating budgets. This proves that when institutional survival is at stake, the barrier to mobilization is a matter of governance and political will, not just donor law. The current "passive stewardship" model uses intergenerational duty as a shield for institutional paralysis. And fore-thinking administrators can always encourage donors not to attach any restrictions or requirements to their gifts.

To mitigate the risk of politically motivated interference, administrators must consider academic freedom as an existential requirement. Why not allocate a percentage of interest in high interest yielding years to a fund that would also grow, that could be used to prevent federal intervention? It might include monies for legal defense, contingency research funding, and promotional campaigns to build support for the university's mission and independence. Such resources would signal to policymakers that the institution has the liquidity to maintain autonomy regardless of federal withdrawals.

Ivy League leadership must shift from "passive stewardship" to "active defense." The record returns of fiscal year 2025 are a hollow victory if they are merely reinvested while the university's core mission is eroded by political volatility. If these multi-billion-dollar windfalls are not utilized to insulate the mission of free inquiry now, the long-term "purchasing power" of the endowment will support only a compromised, hollowed-out academic environment. A $56.9 billion endowment is a hollow monument if the research it funds is dictated by the whims of a federal administration. If your mission is important defend it; if not, don't do it.

The university’s autonomy is its most valuable asset; it is time to prove that it is not for sale.

Eric Welch, GFS, '65; Penn,'69

Resources used, all tables are mine as are any errors.

Columbia Finance. "IMC CEO Statement on FY25 Endowment Returns." Columbia University. October 23, 2025.
Columbia University. "Financial Overview | Columbia University in the City of New York.".
Hamlin, Jessica. "Ivy League endowments' uncanny year." PitchBook. November 4, 2025. https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/ivy-league-endowments-uncanny-year
Narvekar, N.P. “Narv.” "Harvard Management Company: Message from the Chief Executive Officer." Harvard Management Company. October 2025.
Penn Office of Investments. "About Us | Penn Office of Investments." University of Pennsylvania. https://www.thedp.com/article/2025/09/penn-board-of-trustees-meeting-sept-25
Shaughnessy, Aidan. "Penn Board of Trustees reviews faculty appointments, budget resolutions to end fiscal year 2025." The Daily Pennsylvanian. September 26, 2025.
TIFF Investment Management. "FY2025 NACUBO Results Show Strong Returns but Rising Pressures on Institutions’ Budgets." February 17, 2026.
Yardley, Jonathan. "Comparing Ivy League Endowment Returns." Chief Investment Officer (CIO). November 11, 2025

Wednesday, March 04, 2026

Why Bombs Don't Break Regimes

In the high-stakes arena of international affairs, military coercion is often portrayed as a precise, low-cost intervention—what some have dubbed the "aerial surgeon." For policymakers seeking to avoid the political and human costs of ground operations, the promise of air power to compel regime change appears both elegant and expedient. The underlying assumption is straightforward: inflict sufficient damage from altitude, and the target regime will either capitulate or collapse under domestic pressure.

Yet historical precedent consistently undermines this optimistic calculus. From the Luftwaffe’s failure to break British morale during the Blitz (1940) to the United States’ decade-long "Rolling Thunder" campaign over North Vietnam (1965–1968), strategic bombing has demonstrated a near-universal inability to achieve political objectives through punishment alone. These campaigns did not weaken resolve—they often hardened it. The lesson is clear: air power, while capable of inflicting material damage, rarely alters the calculus of regime survival.

A central fallacy in the doctrine of strategic bombing is the assumption that civilian suffering will erode public support for a regime. In reality, external aggression often triggers a powerful unifying effect. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), we observe that when a nation faces an external threat, internal divisions tend to dissolve in favor of collective identity and national solidarity.

This "rally-around-the-flag" phenomenon is not merely a spontaneous outburst of patriotism. It is systematically reinforced by elite consensus. Even political opponents of the ruling regime—dissidents, opposition leaders, and civil society figures—often suspend criticism during periods of external attack. This convergence of elite and public sentiment creates a formidable barrier to regime change, as the regime is perceived not as a target of domestic discontent but as a defender of national sovereignty.

Thus, rather than weakening the regime, sustained bombing can inadvertently strengthen its legitimacy, portraying the government as the nation’s last line of defense.

Modern air campaigns are frequently marketed as "precision" operations, capable of isolating targets with minimal collateral impact. However, the reality of urban warfare and complex terrain often undermines this narrative. Even advanced targeting systems struggle to distinguish between military installations and civilian infrastructure in densely populated areas.

When civilian casualties occur—inevitable in any large-scale bombing campaign—the strategic consequences are profound. They generate widespread resentment, fuel recruitment for insurgent movements, and provide powerful propaganda tools for the regime. In many cases, the very act of bombing becomes a recruitment event for the opposition, turning victims into combatants. Moreover, the perception of disproportionate force—especially when inflicted by a foreign power—can galvanize nationalist sentiment and deepen the regime’s grip on power.

Regimes are not monolithic entities defined solely by their leaders. They are sustained by intricate networks of security forces, intelligence agencies, and bureaucratic institutions. These structures are designed to endure crises, including external military pressure. Even when leadership is targeted or disrupted, alternative command structures often activate seamlessly. The regime’s ability to reorganize, relocate, and continue operations—often with increased secrecy and control—undermines the assumption that bombing can "decapitate" a government. In many cases, air strikes merely force the regime to go underground, not collapse.

Furthermore, the very institutions that maintain control—such as state media and surveillance systems—are often decentralized or redundant, allowing them to survive and adapt under bombardment.

Strategic bombing is often justified as a tool of coercive diplomacy—using the threat of force to extract concessions. However, the effectiveness of coercion depends on the target’s perception of the costs of resistance versus compliance.
For regimes that perceive survival as paramount—especially those with authoritarian or ideologically driven leadership—the cost of capitulation may be seen as greater than the cost of enduring bombardment. In such cases, the regime may calculate that prolonged resistance, even at great human and material cost, is preferable to surrender.

Additionally, external powers often lack the political will or strategic patience to sustain a campaign long enough to achieve its objectives. The result is a premature withdrawal, which is interpreted not as a victory but as a sign of weakness—further emboldening the regime.

While air power remains a critical component of military capability, its utility as a tool for regime change is severely overstated. The four truths outlined above—cohesion under threat, the limits of precision, institutional resilience, and the failure of coercive diplomacy—demonstrate that bombing campaigns rarely achieve their intended political outcomes.

For policymakers, the takeaway is clear: air power must be integrated into a broader, politically grounded strategy. It should not be viewed as a substitute for diplomacy, intelligence, or economic statecraft. When used in isolation, it risks becoming not a tool of influence, but a catalyst for prolonged conflict and unintended consequences. True strategic success lies not in the number of bombs dropped, but in the depth of understanding of the adversary’s psychology, institutions, and incentives.

Resources for this essay:

Pape, R. A. (2014). Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war. Cornell University Press. (my library) (n.d.).Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/gauging-the-impact-of-massive-u-s-israeli-strikes-on-iran

Hinman, Ellwood P . The Politics of Coercion. Free download
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Display/Article/4117513/the-politics-of-coercion/ Lt. Col. Hinman's short paper argues that existing theories of coercive airpower — punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial — each have significant limitations when applied to the limited, politically restrained conflicts of the post–Cold War era. After analyzing each theory against three defining attributes of modern conflict (limited and nonprotracted war, political restraint, and the need for a favorable postwar peace), Hinman finds that none is adequate as a stand-alone approach.

Jan, F. N. (2026, March 2). ‘Destruction is not the same as political success’: US bombing of Iran shows little evidence of endgame strategy. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/destruction-is-not-the-same-as-political-success-us-bombing-of-iran-shows-little-evidence-of-endgame-strategy-277201

https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/bombing-to-win-at-25/

Lambet, Benjamin S. Operation Allied Force: Lessons for the Future, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB75.html

Tuesday, March 03, 2026

Review: Steel Boat, Iron Hearts: A U-boat Crewman's Life Aboard U-505

U-505, the U-Boot that currently resides in the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago, has to have been one of the luckiest ships in WW II. It survived multiple botched patrols, was the only German sub whose captain committed suicide while on patrol, and was the most damaged sub to be able to return to base. It was captured in 1944 and secreted away until after the war, when it was donated to the museum. It's a spectacular exhibit but not for the claustrophobic.

It was imperative for the allies that it remain secret the sub had been captured as the Allies did not want even a hint that they might have captured an Enigma machine (they already had, but it was essential the Germans not suspect Enigma had been compromised.) Admiral King was furious they had not sunk the sub and almost had the task force commander court-martialed. The crew was hidden in Louisiana and not even allowed Red Cross parcels to protect the secret it had been captured. The Germans finally declared her sunk with all hands and notified the next of kin. The crew did not make it home until 1947. One interesting tidbit is that Ewald Felix, a member of the crew, helped the U.S. prevented the sub from sinking. He was isolated from the rest of the crew for fear he would be killed as a traitor. After the war, he lived in Poland and died in 1990.

The operational history of U-505 serves as a compelling case study in the duality of naval fortune, where the vessel was regarded as both exceptionally "lucky" and hopelessly "jinxed." From a strategic intelligence perspective, the boat’s early service record highlights the critical importance of submarine durability in the attritional environment of the Battle of the Atlantic. While structural resilience allowed the boat to survive catastrophic encounters that would have claimed lesser vessels, this physical longevity inadvertently set the stage for a protracted psychological and mechanical erosion that would eventually compromise its operational security.

One reason for the U-505's survival was that it kept having to return to Lorient for repairs almost immediately after leaving port. Repair workers were mostly French and there was constant sabotage of the boat that would show up (almost catastrophically) in diving tests or engine breakdowns usually within days after leaving for patrol. They seemed to spend more time getting repaired as stalking the allies.

The vessel's reputation for resilience was established on November 11, 1942, during a patrol in the Caribbean. A Lockheed Hudson launched a precision air attack, delivering a 250-lb bomb that struck the foredeck directly. The explosion was severe enough to tear the deck gun from the mount and breach the pressure hull. Despite the initial command to abandon ship, the crew executed a desperate two-week salvage effort to maintain buoyancy.

U-505 eventually limped back to Lorient on December 12, 1942, earning the "mixed honor" of being the most heavily damaged U-boat of the war to successfully return to port.

Following these repairs, U-505’s combat effectiveness was methodically neutralized by the French Resistance. This systematic campaign of industrial sabotage in the Lorient dockyards did more than merely disable the boat; it functioned as a form of psychological warfare against the commander, Peter Zschech. The resulting six consecutive aborted patrols—where the boat failed even to clear the Bay of Biscay—turned U-505 into a fleet-wide laughingstock. Specific mechanical failures included:

Defective Welds: Intentional structural weaknesses that led to failures during high-pressure diving tests.
Engine Sabotage: Strategic tampering by French dock workers that ensured engine breakdowns within days of departure.
Systemic Failure: The inability to sustain a patrol created a feedback loop of humiliation, as peers noted that Zschech was the only captain "guaranteed to return home" while other crews were lost at sea.

In the isolated, high-pressure environment of a submerged U-boat, the commanding officer's psychological state is the single most critical point of failure. The tenure of Peter Zschech demonstrates how a breakdown in leadership doctrine can transform a crew into a strategic liability. While Zschech was a professional veteran of the celebrated U-124, his transition to independent command revealed a temperament ill-suited for the stresses of the late-war Atlantic. He was characterized as a "hard," bad-tempered officer whose perceived indifference to morale exacerbated the frustrations caused by the boat's constant mechanical failures.

The crisis reached its terminal point on October 24, 1943. During a concentrated depth charge attack by Allied destroyers off the Azores, Zschech suffered a catastrophic mental break. In an unprecedented breach of naval discipline, he committed suicide in the control room using a Walther PPK pistol, in full view of the men he was tasked to lead. The impact of this event remains a subject of historical debate.

Geobeler challenges the traditional view of the suicide, which maintains the suicide shattered the crew's discipline, creating a vacuum of leadership and a climate of panic that persisted until the boat's capture. He insists Morale arguably improved because Zschech was loathed; his death removed a toxic presence, and the crew continued to operate professionally.

The capture of a submarine intact on the high seas is one of the most significant achievements in naval intelligence, providing a rare opportunity for technological reverse-engineering. The boarding party’s success was a triumph of improvisation; notably, only one member of the USN team had ever been on a submarine before. The recovery hinged on the "Sea Strainer" incident. Crewman Hans Goebeler had removed the strainer cover to flood the boat, but in the rush to evacuate a vessel rendered unmanageable by a jammed rudder, the cover was left nearby. USN sailor Zenon Lukosius discovered the gushing breach and, alongside Lieutenant (jg) Albert David, successfully replaced the cover despite the risk of booby traps. He was awarded the Medal of Honor.

This strategic success necessitated that the crew of U-505 vanish into a shadow world of clandestine internment to maintain the secret of the Enigma breakthrough.

Another salient feature of the book is how British and American bombing attacks actually hardened the resolve of the crew to fight on and get revenge for the damage being done to their surroundings and at home. The historical and contemporary record of using strategic bombing to force regime change is remarkably consistent: while air-power can decimate infrastructure and military hardware, it almost never results in the collapse of a government or a popular uprising.

Research across a century of warfare—from World War II to the ongoing operations in 2026—suggests that bombing often has the opposite effect, reinforcing a regime's grip on power through "rally-round-the-flag" dynamics. This was true in Germany, Vietnam, Iraq, and 2025 Iran.

Trump take note.

For further reading on that last point see https://www.newstimes.com/news/article/destruction-is-not-the-same-as-political-21950977.php