The latest issue of the New York Review of Books has an essay by Fintan O'Toole discussing the Madman Theory as it pertains to Trump. During his first term, Donald Trump revitalized the Madman theory—a strategic tactic originally associated with the Nixon era—to disrupt the long-standing nuclear stalemate with North Korea. By projecting a persona of volatility through "Fire and Fury" rhetoric and "Little Rocket Man" jabs on social media, he sought to convince Kim Jong Un that the United States was no longer bound by traditional diplomatic restraint. The goal was to create a sense of unpredictability that would unnerve Pyongyang, forcing them to the negotiating table out of fear that the U.S. might actually pivot to military action. This high-stakes psychological game ultimately replaced the previous policy of "strategic patience" and paved the way for the unprecedented direct summits between the two leaders. Whether it was deliberate or not, and how it applies to the current situation with Iran, got me thinking about the history of the theory and led me down another rabbit hole.
O’Toole posits that Donald Trump has weaponized a chaotic iteration of the Madman Theory—the strategic display of irrationality famously articulated by Nixon to Haldeman. ** However, I suspect this was more of a Nixonian post-hoc justification than a viable strategy for ending the Vietnam War. Trump, by contrast, uses it to dismantle traditional diplomacy in an attempt to gain leverage over adversaries like North Korea and Iran. If that was indeed his strategy in North Korea, it worked. I suspect Iran's leaders, whomever they may be, regard him very differently.
While Trump explicitly coached associates like Nikki Haley and William Barr in the first term on projecting "just the right amount of crazy" as a shrewd negotiating tactic. O'Toole cites several incidents where Trump (all in his first term) expressed to Cabinet members that his tweets were deliberately intended to display a craziness. He told William Barr, "“Do you know what the secret is of a really good tweet?” he asked, looking at each of us one by one. We all looked blank. “Just the right amount of crazy,” he said."
O’Toole suggests the line between performative theater and genuine psychological instability has effectively dissolved. This reality is obvious to most observers, yet remains a blind spot for much of the mainstream media.
Drawing on testimonies from former cabinet members who witnessed non-performative rages, a disconnect from objective reality, and kaleidoscopic shifts in policy, the author contends that Trump’s behavior has evolved from a controlled "act" into a dangerous, structural form of governance. Ultimately, by broadcasting this perceived psychosis to the public and allies alike, Trump abandons the traditional constraints of the theory, replacing diplomatic cooperation with a volatile, unpredictable hegemony.
Nixon didn't invent the theory. Apparently, Kissinger, that evil genius, came up with it for a speech in 1962, and we all know how tight Kissinger and Nixon were. The dissertation by Campbell-Seremetis examines the validity of the theory as a strategy. He points out that "particularly in democracies, elites are subject to political pressure from the public, whose attitudes towards diplomacy and force are ... heavily influenced by beliefs about the objectivity and competence of adversary leaders." (I am reminded of Karl Kraus' observation that politicians lie to the press and then believe what they read.*)
Campbell-Seremetis argues that labeling a foreign leader as "irrational" or a "Madman" fundamentally shifts public support toward more aggressive and less diplomatic policy options. It carries several risks:
1.) When an adversary is perceived as a "Madman," the public is significantly more likely to support hostile measures—such as sanctions or military force—before diplomatic dialogue has been exhausted.
2.) Perceived bias in a foreign leader makes the public pessimistic about the effectiveness of rational dialogue, leading them to view military methods as more effective than diplomatic ones.
3.) Interestingly, the public is more likely to advocate for concessions to an "unreasonable" or "crazy" adversary if they also believe that leader is highly competent.
But it works both ways. In the current situation, Trump may find himself more in the role of the public than the leader in his perceptions of the craziness or instability of the Iranians. Or, maybe he's just bored. Leaders may intentionally brand a rising adversary as irrational to manipulate the public into supporting costly alternatives to diplomacy, such as the "Saddam the Madman" narrative used by the George W. Bush administration. Conversely, a sustained campaign to convince the public that an adversary is "objective" can create the necessary political space for diplomacy. For example, characterizing Mikhail Gorbachev as "a man we can do business with" helped pivot the US public away from seeing Soviet leaders as purely irrational ideologues.
In the Korean War case study, the Truman administration was restricted by an American public that viewed the Soviets as "Fanatics" due to red-scare rhetoric. This gap between elite and public preferences forced the government to rely on back-channels for dialogue to avoid domestic political backlash. That assumes professionals are available. I'm not sure how much trust we should have in Kushner et al, especially given their financial stakes in the outcome.
Frank Zagare posits that the "Madman Theory" fails as a reliable strategic strategy because a truly rational adversary will recognize that a perceived "madman" is either bluffing or is so unpredictable that they cannot be manipulated by conventional means anyway.
Joshua Scwartz's study shows that the success of the Madman Strategy depends on a delicate balance between external gains and internal stability. Schwartz highlights that the strategy is most effective when the domestic costs can be mitigated or when the international stakes are high enough to justify the political risk. However, the consistent finding is that the public generally prefers "rational" leadership, making the Madman Strategy a high-stakes gamble that risks long-term domestic legitimacy for short-term diplomatic concessions. This tension explains why the strategy is relatively rare in history despite its theoretical potential for coercive success.
Even assuming it's a valid Trump strategy, he has lost (if he ever had) the ability to apply it strategically, especially when surrounded by rank amateurs. But then. Kissinger admitted it would never work in a democracy anyway.
Something none of these authors even hinted at is dementia.
*Diplomats tell lies to journalists and believe them when they see them in print”. The original "Wie wird die Welt regiert und in den Krieg geführt? Diplomaten belügen Journalisten und glauben es, wenn sie’s lesen, which I bastardized slightly, is from his book of aphorisms, Nachts. (1918)
**What Nixon said to Haldeman,
I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that “for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button”—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace
Sources:
Devanny, Joe (2022) ‘Madman Theory’ or ‘Persistent Engagement’? The Coherence of US Cyber Strategy under Trump, Journal of Applied Security Research, 17:3, 282-309, DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2021.1872359
Kissinger, H. A. (2023, December 7). The unsolved problems of European defense. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1962-07-01/unsolved-problems-european-defense also http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029577?origin=JSTOR-pdf
Schwartz, Joshua A. "Madman or Mad Genius? The International Benefits and Domestic Costs of the Madman Strategy." Security Studies, (2023). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2023.2197619
Zagare, Frank . Rationality and Deterrence. (n.d.). Personal Websites - University at Buffalo. https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~fczagare/Articles/Rationality%20and%20Deterrence.pdf
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