Trump’s Iran war convinced me to go back and read multiple articles and
books about the disastrous history of the Persian Gulf following the
events in 1953 and then the revolution in 1979. In August 1953, the CIA
alongside Britain’s MI6, orchestrated a covert coup d'état code-named
Operation Ajax to overthrow Iran's democratically elected Prime
Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. The U.S. and Britain were angry after
Mossadegh nationalized the country’s oil industry, stripping control
away from the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP).
Fearing a total British oil embargo would collapse Iran's economy and
push Mossadegh into a communist alliance with the neighboring Soviet
Union, the U.S. stepped in. The CIA bribed military officers, paid mobs
to stage violent anti-government riots, and weaponized the press to
create artificial chaos in Tehran. Ultimately, Mossadegh was arrested,
and the monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was restored to absolute
power as a loyal, autocratic ally of the West—an intervention that
successfully secured Western oil interests for the next quarter-century
but sowed deep anti-American resentment that would explode during the
1979 revolution leading to Carter’s downfall during the hostage crisis
and Reagan’s ascendancy. But that’s another story. The current mess in
the Strait of Hormuz and the ascendency of Iran as the real power in the
Persian Gulf has its origins many decades ago and one of those events
was the infamous Tanker War which, I, to my shame, had either ignored at
the time or totally forgotten.
The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and
Iraq's Maritime Swordplay by Nadia El-Sayed El-Shazly pretty much is the
definitive user manual if you want to know how a localized ground brawl
escalates into an international naval free-for-all. First published in
1998, the book provides a microscopic view of the 1984-1988 phase of the
Iran-Iraq war, when the conflict spilled over into the vital shipping
lanes of the Persian Gulf. El-Shazly does not see the whole mess as a
random series of maritime skirmishes, but as a deliberate strategic
calculation by a desperate Iraqi regime trying to break a bloody
stalemate.
What makes her story so compelling is the combination
of high-stakes strategic theory and raw data. She employs the classic
military heavyweights, such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, to explain why
Saddam Hussein chose to weaponize the sky above the Gulf. Iraq couldn't
match Iran's massive manpower pool or its geographical depth on land,
but they had a serious edge in airpower. Baghdad hoped to choke Iran's
oil economy with a campaign against commercial shipping, engineer
international intervention and force a reluctant Ayatollah Khomeini to
the negotiating table. It was pretty much a textbook case of attempting
to use military leverage to force a diplomatic solution when the ground
war went sideways. Sound familiar? This book is a stark reminder that
the ocean is never insulated from the politics of the land, and commerce
often follows its own rules even when missiles fly.
The entire
study rests on the incredible data that El-Shazly was able to pull
together. She secured specialist access to Lloyd’s Register of Shipping
records, the equivalent of the Holy Grail for tracking merchant ship
casualties. In these records she compiles a painstaking, month-by-month
ledger of the conflict that shows up some hilarious, if tragic, ironies
of wartime commerce.
Her data, for example, shows how economic
self-interest regularly overrode political loyalties. You had tankers
owned by Iraq’s supposedly staunch Arab allies casually cruising into
Iranian ports to lift crude oil because the profit margins were just too
good to pass up. Her work reveals the exact anatomy of the attacks,
showing that Iraq actually fired most of the anti-shipping strikes using
French-supplied Exocet missiles, while Iran used asymmetrical tactics
such as speedboats, mines, and shore-based Silkworm missiles after they
began to retaliate. Deja Vu all over again.
El-Shazly comes up
with an overall total that shows Iraqi forces fired more individual
strikes against commercial vessels than the Iranians, thus blowing the
current Western media spin that Iran was the only aggressor on the
water.
The data tracks the weird mayhem of identification errors –
Iraqi pilots bombed friendly vessels or vessels carrying oil belonging
to their own backers because it’s easier said than done to fly through a
chaotic combat zone in the dark.
It tells of the exact moment Kuwait
got worried enough to ask the great superpowers to step in, leading to
the iconic re-flagging operation where the US Navy started escorting
merchant ships flying the American flag.
The figures given by
El-Shazly perfectly illustrate the slow-motion panic of the Iraqi
command. The strategy was an escalatory gamble born of pure anxiety.
They had to make the war somebody else's problem, so the international
community would intervene and stop it, and that was exactly what
happened when the US military footprint in the Gulf reached a point of
no return.
Cut to today in 2026 and the reverberations of this
maritime swordplay are louder than ever in international diplomacy. If
you look at current flashpoints, from the regular disruptions in the
Strait of Hormuz to the broader maritime chokepoints in the Middle East,
the playbook being used today was written during the Tanker War.
The
most obvious legacy is the template for asymmetric naval warfare. In
the 1980s, Iran recognized that it did not require a large conventional
blue-water navy to confront Western superpowers. They discovered that a
combination of cheap sea mines, fast attack craft and shore-to-ship
missiles could do as good a job as well. This creates a constant nervous
deterrent in diplomatic venues today. Western diplomats cannot simply
threaten naval blockades or freedom of navigation operations without
reckoning with the massive insurance hikes and economic fallout that
El-Shazly meticulously detailed decades ago.
Moreover, the Tanker
War changed the perception of outside protection of the regional states
for ever. The re-flagging of Kuwaiti ships established a precedent that
the flow of oil was ultimately guaranteed by global powers, a fact that
still underlies the security architectures of the Gulf states today.
This created a dynamic where maritime security is never simply a local
issue but a global economic trigger. Reading El-Shazly’s book today is
more than a nostalgic walk down memory lane. It’s a stark reminder that
the rules of engagement, the vulnerabilities of merchant shipping, and
the diplomatic brinkmanship playing out on modern waters are the same
games these nations have been playing for forty years.
She
touches briefly in the final chapter on the USS Stark incident as well
the tragedy of the Iranian passenger plane. On July 3, 1988, the
high-tech Aegis air defense cruiser USS Vincennes—affectionately dubbed
"Robocruiser" by its own crew for its captain’s aggressive
swagger—managed to mistake a massive, slow-climbing civilian Airbus A300
for a rapidly descending supersonic F-14 Tomcat. Despite the Iranian
passenger jet squawking a perfectly civilian transponder code and flying
precisely within its designated commercial corridor, the American
warship fired two surface-to-air missiles, instantly vaporizing 290
innocent people. In a masterclass of geopolitical gaslighting, the U.S.
Navy initially blamed the civilian pilots for not radioing back on
military frequencies they couldn't hear, while President George H.W.
Bush later famously declared he would "never apologize for the United
States of America, ever, I don't care what the facts are." Naturally,
the ship's crew returned home to a hero's welcome, complete with combat
ribbons, and the captain was awarded the Legion of Merit for his
"exceptionally meritorious conduct"—proving that in the theater of
modern warfare, blowing up an airliner full of families is just another
day of stellar resume-building.
Friday, July 03, 2026
Review: The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay by Nadia El-Sayed El-Shazly
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1 comment:
There’s so much back info I don’t know. Turns out it makes me disgusted. Good for you fir investigating and getting more informed
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